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FEDERAL INCOME TAX DEVELOPMENTS: 1977
MERLIN G. BRINER*
INTRODUCTION
F EDERAL INCOME TAX DEVELOPMENTS: 1977 is the fifth of an annual
series of articles to be published in the AKRON LAW REVIEW. The scope
of this survey is limited to the substantive developments in the field of income
taxation. The thrust of this article is not only to identify the new develop-
ments, but also to trace these concepts through their formulative changes.
This article covers the new developments in the case law including those
cases and rulings implementing the TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976.
Given the volatile nature of taxation, it is crucial for the practitioner
in this field to remain current with the changes which have occurred during
the year. Research of this article includes cases decided through December 1,
1977.
In an attempt to minimize the lead time between research and publica-
tion, this author has engaged the most able assistance of several members
of the AKRON LAW REVIEW. Without their substantial contributions and
complete dedication, this article would not have been possible. The author,
therefore, wishes to recognize and thank the following members of the
AKRON LAW REVIEW, for their efforts in researching, writing and compiling
this article: Stephen Colecchi, R. Marshall Jones, Gregory L. Petersen, and
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1:00 Income
1.01 Educational Benefit Trusts - Income to Employee-Parents
During the past several years, a number of corporations have set up
educational benefit trusts to provide funds to meet the rising costs of college
or postgraduate educational expenses of the children of certain key employees.
Two general questions have arisen in connection with these educational
benefit trusts. First, are these contributions taxable to the employees? If so,
when are they taxable? Second, are the contributions deductible by the
employer? And, if so, when are they deductible?
In Richard T. Armantrout,' a corporation set up an educational benefit
trust for its key employees. The Service maintained that distributions to
Armantrout's children in the years 1971, 1972 and 1973 constituted taxable
income for which there was a deficiency. Armantrout argued that the dis-
tributions did not constitute gross income since he neither received nor had
the right to receive the distributions himself.
While that case was pending, the Internal Revenue Service issued
Revenue Ruling 75-4482 which essentially stated that distributions from an
educational benefit trust shall be included in the employee's gross income
and shall be deductible by the employer to the extent that the vesting require-
ments of the trust have been met. However, in deciding Richard T. Arman-
trout, the Tax Court did not even acknowledge this ruling. The court simply
noted that the plan relieved the corporation's most important employees
from concern about the cost of providing a college education for their
children. Therefore, the court concluded that the distribution to the employee's
children was in substance taxable income since the "income must be taxed
to him who earns it."8
1.02 Installment Sales to Family Members
A seller who receives 30 percent or less of the sales price of property
167 T.C. No. 82 (March 23, 1977).
2 Rev. Rul. 75-448, 1975 INT. Rzv. BULL. No. 2.
8 67 T.C. at 530.
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in the year of sale may make the installment sales election under Section 453.'
Such election entitles the seller to report his gain as payments are received.
Each year the seller reports a part of his gain equal to the proportion of the
payment received that the gain on the sale bears to the total contract price.
Benefits of such an election include: (1) the deferral of gain until cash is
received in order to pay the tax on the gain; (2) spreading the gain out over
a number of years so as to tax the gain at a lower marginal tax rate; and
(3) avoidance of the excess long-term capital gain as a tax-preference item."
In Nye v. United States,' petitioners Charles and Mary Nye were both
successful professionals who maintained separate checking accounts for their
practices and investments. Charles had a future obligation to make a
$100,000 payment; therefore, upon his initiative, Mary sold him securities
electing the installment sales method. Four months later, when Charles'
obligation became due, he sold the securities and made the necessary pay-
ment. Although Revenue Rulings 73-5361 and 73-1578 appear to be con-
sistent with the facts in the Nye case, the court refused to acknowledge them,
relying instead upon the standard found in Rushing v. Commissioner.' The
court therein held that a taxpayer may not receive the benefits of the install-
ment sales provisions if he achieves the same result as if he had immediately
collected the full sales price." The Nye court, using this reasoning, allowed
the installment sale, holding that the petitioners were two separate economic
entities with two legitimate purposes for entering into an installment sale.
The fact that Mrs. Nye's purpose was to minimize her tax consequences did
not make her purpose illegitimate.
In Philip W. Wrenn," Mr. Wrenn sold securities which he had held
separately, to his wife. Mrs. Wrenn then held the securities separately. How-
ever, as a condition of the sale, Mrs. Wrenn was to provide her husband
with $250,000 worth of shares in Fidelity Trend Fund as security. To
.satisfy that condition, Mrs. Wrenn sold all the securities originally purchased
' INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 453.
5 See O'Hare, Installment Sales to Related Parties Under Section 453(b) of the Internal
Revenue Code, 29 NAT'L TAx J. 31 (1976).
6 75-1 U.S. TAX CAS. 9510 (M.D.S.C. 1975).
Rev. Rul. 73-536, 1973-1 CuM. BULL. 158 states in part that a "purported installment sale
between family members followed shortly thereafter by a resale to an unrelated third party
does not qualify for installment reporting where it was the intention of the family members
to resell the property and receive full payment upon such resale."
8 Rev. Rul. 73-157, 1973-1 CuM. BULL. 213 states in part that a "taxpayer may not use the in-
stallment method to report gain from a sale to a related taxpayer who pursuant to a pre-
arranged plan resells the property to a third party and receives full payment in the year
of sale."
p441 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1971), aff'g 52 T.C. 888 (1969).
'Old. at 598. See also Williams v. United States, 219 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1955).
11 67 T.C. No. 41 (Dec. 23, 1976).
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from her husband on that same day and purchased the $250,000 worth of
shares in Fidelity Trend Fund. The Wrenns filed a joint return with Mr.
Wrenn electing to use the installment sales method on those securities sold
to his wife. The Service rejected this use of the installment method, maintain-
ing that the sale lacked substance. The Tax Court made a detailed examina-
tion of Nye but was able to distinguish the facts. The court found that the
instant petitioners were not separate economic entities, nor did they have
two legitimate purposes for the purported sale.'2 The court further found
that Mrs. Wrenn was engaged in a regular program of selling the purchased
shares as security to generate the necessary cash to make her installment
payments. Such conduct negated any implication that Mrs. Wrenn desired
to own the particular shares for any reason."8 Another distinguishing factor,
although not discussed by the court, was that Mrs. Wrenn sold the securities
on the day she purchased them from her husband; thus, she was not subject
to any market risk as compared to the four month period that Mr. Nye held
his securities.' As a result, the court held that the installment sales method
of deferring gain cannot be elected under the peculiar facts of Wrenn.
1.03 Head of Household
The unmarried 5 taxpayer who provides a household for certain depen-
dents'6 is allowed a special tax rate.' That tax rate provides the taxpayer
with approximately one-half of the tax benefit that is granted to married
taxpayers filing joint returns.'8 However, in order to qualify as a head of a
household, the unmarried taxpayer must maintain the principal place of
abode for the dependent" and contribute at least one-half of the cost of
maintaining that dependent.2
In Revenue Ruling 70-279,11 the Internal Revenue Service has taken
12 id. at 308-09.
is Id.
1 O'Hare, Installment Sales to Related Parties Under Section 453(b) of the Internal Revenue
Code, 29 NAT'L TAX J. 33 (1976).
'5 See INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 2(b)(1). This section requires that the individual neither
be a surviving spouse nor married at the close of the tax year.
16 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2(b)(1)(A)(i), (ii) defines a dependent as: (i) a son, step-
son, daughter, or stepdaughter of the taxpayer or a descendant of a son or daughter of the
taxpayer .... or (ii) any other person who is a dependent of the taxpayer .
1
7 See INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1(b).
Is Compare INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § l(b) (head of household rate) with INT. REV. CODE
of 1954, § l(a) (rate for spouses filing joint returns). Also compare INT. REV. CODE of
1954, § 1 (b) with INT. REV. CODE of 154, § 1(c) (single taxpayer rate).
19 See INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2(b) (1) (A). However, the Code also requires that the
head of household maintain his home at the place he is maintaining for the dependent,
unless the dependent is his mother or father. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2(b)(l) (A), (B).
20 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2(b)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1. 2-2(d).
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the position that a single taxpayer who maintains a parent in an institution
qualifies as a head of the household. The taxpayer seeking relief under this
ruling paid the room and board for his father at a rest home. The Service
granted that relief and reasoned that the taxpayer's financial maintenance
of his father at a rest home was equivalent to the maintenance of a parent's
principal place of abode.
1.04 Life Insurance Companies - Taxable Income
Code Sections 801 through 820 were first introduced by the Life
Insurance Company Income Tax Act of 1959,2 and the sections apply to
all tax years after 1957. Essentially, the Act preserves the basic concept of
taxing only that portion of the life insurance company's income which is
not required to meet policyholder obligations.
Section 802(b) defines life insurance company taxable income as the
lesser of the company's taxable investment income or gain from operations;
and if the gain from operations exceeds the taxable investment income, an
amount equal to 50 percent of such excess must be added in. A company's
taxable investment income is determined in relation to its assets and reserves
such that an increase in a company's reserves will reduce its tax."3 A com-
pany's gain from operations includes the gross amount of premiums but, in
addition, a deduction is allowed for the increase in its reserves."' Therefore,
a life insurance company, in an attempt to reduce its taxes, will try to
minimize the amount of its premiums includible in its gain from operations,
increase the amount of its reserves, and decrease the amount of its assets.
In Commissioner v. Standard Life & Accident Insurance Company,25
the Supreme Court ruled that the net valuation portion of unpaid premiums,
but not the loading, must be included in assets and gross premium income,
as well as in reserves. Here, the respondent life insurance company placed
the gross amount of premiums including unpaid premiums in reserves; how-
ever, only the net valuation premium portion, excluding unpaid premiums,
was included in assets and income.26 Prior to the court's decision, the
Fourth,2 1 Fifth," Sixth,29 Seventh,"9 and Eighth Circuits"' had held that unpaid
2 Life Insurance Company Income Tax Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-69, 73 Stat. 112
(June 25, 1959).
23 I'. REv. CODE of 1954, § 804(a)(2).
24INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 809(d)(2).
2540 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 77-5191 (1977), rev'g and rem'g 36 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 75-6309
(10th Cir. 1975).
26 Unpaid premiums consist of deferred and uncollected premiums which amounted to
$1,800,000 in 1961.
27 Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 408 F.2d 842 (4th Cir. 1968).
28 Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co. of Texas v. Commissioner, 432 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1970).
2 9 Western and Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 460 F.2d 8 (6th Cir. 1972).
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premiums must be included as an asset in determining a life insurance com-
pany's taxable investment income.
A life insurance company's "gross premiums" consist of two components
-net valuation premium and loading. Net valuation premium is determined
by state law in accordance with mortality and interest assumptions. Loading
is an amount determined by each company and it includes profits and ex-
penses. The issue presented to the court concerned the extent to which
unpaid premiums are includible in reserves, assets and gross premiums as
used in the Life Insurance Company Income Tax Act of 1959.
Under normal accounting principles, a cash-basis taxpayer would ignore
unpaid premiums, but Section 818 (a) requires the use of an accrual method
of accounting and if not inconsistent, in a manner required by the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners.2 Since the insurance commissioners
and state law both require that insurance companies add an amount equal
to the net valuation portion of unpaid premiums to the reserves with an
offsetting addition to assets, the court maintained that such procedures were
not inconsistent with the applicable Code section and therefore were con-
trolling. In explaining its decision, the court discussed four possible solutions,
indicating that although perfect symmetry in tax law is not required, "there
should be a measure of consistency in the accounting treatment of an item
affecting interrelated elements in a formula.""3 As a result, the court eventu-
ally adopted the fourth solution involving the fictional assumption that the
net valuation portion of the premium has been paid, but that the loading
portion has not.
1.05 Group Term Life Insurance - Section 79
Section 79" permits an employer to provide as much as $50,000 of
group term life insurance for his employees without reporting any of its
cost in the employee's gross income. Before 1964, there were no limits on
the amounts of unreported insurance provided for employees. Since 1964,
the reportable cost of group term life insurance in excess of $50,000 has
been governed by the uniform premium table, Table I, in the regulations."
30 Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 399 F.2d 757 (7th Cir. 1968).
31 North Am. Life & Cas. Co. v. United States, 533 F.2d 1046 (8th Cir. 1976).
32 The National Association of Insurance Commissioners is a national organization of state
regulatory officials which acts on behalf of the various state insurance departments and
performs audits. The organization provides an accounting form, which respondent uses, known
as the "Annual Statement."
33 Commissioner v. Standard Life & Accident Ins. Co., 40 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 77-5196 (1977),
rev'g and rem'g 36 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 75-6309 (10th Cir. 1975).
34 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 79.
3 Treas. Reg. § 1.79-3(d) (2).
Fall, 19771
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Today, the widespread use of individual policies of permanent insurance
in plans of group term life insurance has prompted the Commissioner to
scrutinize what has become known as "the Section 79 situation."
The regulations"6 contain requirements for qualifying a group insurance
plan. Table I rates have been very popular because they are generally much
lower than the cost of individually purchased policies. However, until recently,
most small corporations were unable to utilize the tax benefit of Section 79
because most states and many insurance companies restricted the use of the
traditional group term policy to groups of at least ten employees. In 1972,
the Section 79 regulations were modified in such a way that they could be
interpreted as permitting the use of individual policies in plans of group
life insurance.3"
The provision in the regulations permitting a group of individual
policies to be used as part of a plan of group insurance3 has been read
together with the provision requiring that permanent insurance policies
specify that portion of the premium allocable to group term life insurance. 9
This practice has resulted in the use of large individual policies of permanent
insurance for the benefit of certain classes of highly compensated employees.
Each insurance company offering this type of policy has developed its own
formula for allocating the premium between the term and permanent portions
of the policy.
Revenue Ruling 75-528"0 provided that life insurance for groups of
less than ten full-time employees would not qualify as a plan of group
insurance under Section 79 if medical information beyond that required in
a basic questionaire is gathered to establish the premium. All employees
must be insured if a plan for less than ten employees is to qualify as a plan
of group insurance." Consequently, many insurance companies stopped offer-
ing policies for such groups when Revenue Ruling 75-528 restricted the type
of information they could use to rate the individuals to be insured.
On November 4, 1976, the Commissioner announced that he was sus-
pending all private letter rulings issued relative to Section 79 while he
reconsidered the use of policies which provide both pure life insurance
protection and permanent benefits. 2 As a result of this study, proposed
amendments to the Section 79 regulations were published in the Federal
36 Treas. Reg. § 1.79-1(b)(1) (iii).
37 Treas. Reg. § 1.79-1(b)(1).
38 Treas. Reg. § 1.79-1(b)(1)(i).
39Treas. Reg. § 1.79-1(b)(1)(ii).
40 Rev. Rul. 75-528, 1975-2 CuM. BULL. 35.
41Treas. Reg. § 1.79-1(b)(iii)(d).
4242 Fed. Reg. 5371 (1977).
[Vol. 11:2
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Register on January 28, 1977." The regulations were designed to end the
use of permanent insurance in Section 79 plans, with a grandfather clause
for policies in existence before November 5, 1976. In addition, a new
uniform premium table, Table II, was presented which raised the allocable
cost of group term life insurance above the actual cost of many policies.
The furor created by the proposed regulations caused them to be with-
drawn on March 21, 1977." However, the situation remains under study and
private letter rulings remain suspended. New proposed regulations could be
issued as early as 1978. Meanwhile, the sale of permanent insurance as part
of Section 79 plans continues. The purchasers of these policies apparently
believe either that the new proposed regulations will favor their actions, or,
that policies purchased now will be protected from any new regulations by
a savings clause.
1.06 Transfer of Insurance Policy for Value
Section 101 (a) (2)"' is an exception to the general rule that life insur-
ance proceeds are income tax exempt. This is the "transfer-for-value" rule.
When a life insurance policy is transferred for a valuable consideration, the
death proceeds will be taxed as ordinary income to the extent they exceed
the consideration paid, plus any subsequent premiums paid by the transferee.
One exception to the transfer-for-value rule exists if the transfer is to
the insured, his partner, a partnership in which he belongs, or a corporation
in which he is a shareholder or officer. 6 When an insured desires to have
his spouse acquire a corporate-owned policy, he should purchase the policy
from the corporation and then, in a separate transaction, gift it to his spouse.
A direct purchase by the insured's spouse could invoke the transfer-for-value
rule.
In Estate of Rath v. United States," pursuant to a stock redemption
agreement, the insured assigned his rights in the policy to his wife and gave
her $11,600 to buy the policy from the corporation. Upon Mr. Rath's death,
the Commissioner invoked the transfer-for-value rule and imposed a $52,000
tax on the $100,000 of insurance proceeds. The district court found for the
taxpayer by recognizing that the insured's funds were used to purchase the
policy and that he had sufficiently exercised his rights in the policy in order
to fall within an exception to the transfer-for-value rule.
43 Id.
4'42 Fed. Reg. 15,340 (1977).
45 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 101(a)(2).
461d. § 101(a)(2)(B).
4r 39 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 77-1214 (D.C. Mich. Mar. 22, 1977).
Fall, 1977]
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1.07 Investment Annuities
Revenue Ruling 77-85"s ends favorable tax treatment of the investment
annuity by providing that investment earnings are currently includible in the
gross income of the purchaser. An investment annuity is purchased from an
insurance company, but the purchaser retains the ability to control invest-
ments, including the right of withdrawal up to the time annuity payments
commence. The Commissioner determined that the fact that the assets are
held in a custodial account does not outweigh the control by the purchaser.
However, investment annuities established on or before March 9, 1977
retain their favorable tax status provided that no further contributions are
made and the custodial account is treated consistently as the property of the
insurer for all purposes. In addition, employer contributions to qualified
plans utilizing an investment annuity remain permissible if the contributions
are not currently taxable to the employee. "9
Tax-deferred withdrawals of interest from deferred annuities remain
unchallenged by the Commissioner. Any withdrawal of funds which occurs
before the annuity starting date and does not exceed the sum of contributions
to the annuity will be treated as a tax-free return of principal."0 For example,
an investor could purchase a single premium deferred annuity which guaran-
tees interest at seven percent per year and permits annual withdrawals from
the annuity of at least seven percent. By withdrawing seven percent of his
investment each year, he is effectively receiving the interest on his investment
tax-free. The investor will not be taxed on the earned interest until either he
terminates his annuity contract or reaches the "annuity starting date." 1
2.00 Exclusions From Income
3.00 Exemptions
4.00 Deductions
4.01 Medical Expense - Private Schools
Section 1.213-1 (e) (1) (v) (a) of the Regulations provides that the
cost of ordinary education is not includible as a medical expense but that
the cost of attending a special school for a mentally or physically handi-
capped individual can qualify as a deduction under Code Section 213. In
order to qualify as a deduction the school must be considered special in
that the individual's presence at the school is to obtain medical aid for his
or her ailment. If the school does qualify as being special, the regulations
48 Rev. Rul. 77-85, 1977 INT. REV. BuLL. No. 15 at 7.
49 id. at 9.
60 Treas. Reg. § 1.72-1(b).
511Tr. REv. CODE of 1954, § 72(c)(A).
[Vol. 11:2
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and revenue rulings52 permit a deduction for the costs of attending the school
as well as for the costs of meals and lodging, if provided, and for the costs
of ordinary education incidental to the special services furnished by the
school.
In Martin v. Commissioner,5" the Sixth Circuit upheld a Tax Court
decision which denied a medical expense deduction to a taxpayer who sent
his deaf son to a non-public school because the taxpayer failed to prove that
the school qualified as a special school under the regulations, even though
the school gave more individualized instruction than public schools by
maintaining lower student-teacher ratios.
The Tax Court held, and the court of appeals agreed, that since the
taxpayer's son received the same instruction as normal students, he was
present at the school simply to receive an education and not to obtain
medical aid for his hearing ailment; therefore, one of the prerequisites
under the regulations was not fulfilled. The Tax Court rejected the taxpayer's
arguments that the school was special to his son because if placed in public
schools his hearing impairment would have worsened. The court simply
stated that "the school was not furnishing 'medical care' to the child within
the meaning of the statute and regulations."5 The test, as established by the
Sixth Circuit, is that taxpayers, in order to be entitled to a medical deducion
for the costs of education at special schools, must show "that any educational
program at the schools attended was only incidental to a primary medical
care function of mitigating and treating their child's physical handicap."5
4.02 Medical Expense - Capital Improvements
In C. H. Ferrio" the Tax Court recently rejected an Internal Revenue
Service contention that for purposes of the medical expense deduction under
Section 213 the taxpayer is required to obtain the cheapest form of treatment
available. The court allowed the taxpayer to deduct $82,000 of the total
costs of an indoor swimming pool which was constructed after a physician
advised the taxpayer who suffered from a spinal injury to swim twice daily
to prevent paralysis.
The taxpayer constructed a swimming pool addition to her residence
at a total cost of $194,660. The materials and workmanship of the structure
were comparable to the taxpayer's residence which was valued at $275,000
before the addition. On her income tax return the taxpayer deducted $86,000
52 Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(1)(v)(a); Rev. Rul. 58-280, 1958-1 Cum. BULL. 157.
53 548 F.2d 633 (6th Cir. 1977), aff'g 44 P-H TAx CT. MEM. 75,362 (1975).
54 44 P-H TAx CT. MEM. 75,362 at 1530.
5 548 F.2d at 634.
"45 P-H TAX Cr. MBm. 77,186 (June 14, 1977).
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as a medical expense. The amount of this deduction was determined by
utilizing the provisions of the regulations which provide that even though
"capital expenditures are generally not deductible for federal income tax
purposes . . . a capital expenditure for permanent improvement or better-
ment of property which would not ordinarily be for the purpose of medical
care (within the meaning of this paragraph) may, nevertheless, qualify as
a medical expense to the extent that the expenditure exceeds the increase
in the value of the related property, if the particular expenditure is related
directly to medical care."57 An appraisal indicated that the swimming pool
addition increased the value of the taxpayer's residence by $86,160. Sub-
tracting this amount and the costs of non-essential items, amounting to
$22,500, from the total costs of the pool addition resulted in an $86,000
medical expense deduction according to the taxpayer.
The Service contended that a large portion of the costs of the pool
addition were attributable to the taxpayer's personal desires to have the
addition architecturally compatible with the residence and, therefore, were
not incurred for medical reasons. The Service further maintained that an
enclosed pool satisfying the medical needs of the taxpayer could have been
constructed for $70,000. Such an addition would have increased the value
of the taxpayer's residence by $31,000 and would have limited the medical
expense deduction to $39,000 under the regulations.5
The Tax Court rejected the Service's position, maintaining that "we are
aware of no case limiting a medical expense within the meaning of Section
213 to the cheapest form of treatment.""9 The court pointed out that if a
taxpayer desired to stay in a private room or patronize the most expensive
medical institutions, the full amount of the expense would qualify as a
medical expense. The court further pointed out that the regulations effectively
eliminate a tax benefit for any personal element of a capital expenditure
for medical reasons by limiting the amount of the deduction to the difference
between the total expenditure and the amount by which the expenditure
increases the value of the related property. In allowing a medical expense
deduction of $82,000, the Tax Court modified the $86,000 amount used
by the taxpayer by increasing the amount of construction costs allocable to
non-essential items.
After C. H. Ferrio it appears that the only limitations on the amount
of medical expenses deductible are the three percent and one percent limita-
tions of Section 213 and the exclusions under the regulations. The Code and
the regulations place no upper dollar limitations on the amount of deductible
57Treas. Reg. § 1.213-(1)(e)(1)(iii) (emphasis added).
58 Id.
59 45 P-H TAx Qr MEM. 77,186 at 766 (June 14, 1977).
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medical expenses and now the Tax Court has determined that the medical
expense that is deductible is the actual expense, not the cheapest possible
expense.
4.03 Medical Expense - Halfway Houses
The Internal Revenue Service in a private letter ruling 0 released in
early 1977 informed the parents of a child living in a halfway house for
former mental patients that the payments to the institution were a deductible
medical expense under Section 213. The Service relied on previous revenue
rulings and regulations in allowing a deduction for meals and lodging at
the halfway house as long as it could be shown that the availability of
medical care was the principal reason for being in the institution and that
the meals and lodging are necessary to that medical care."'
The facts that gave rise to this letter ruling show that the child had
been a patient in mental hospitals for a number of years and on the recom-
mendation of his personal psychiatrist was admitted to the halfway house.
The purpose of the house was to help individuals adjust from life in a mental
hospital to life in the community and to that end, the staff included a
psychiatrist and mental health counsellors. The parents paid a monthly fee
to the center which covered the cost of room, board and all professional
services.
The Service largely based its decision of allowing a medical deduction
on the basis of three earlier revenue rulings. Revenue Ruling 69-499 pro-
vided that "amounts paid by the taxpayer to maintain his mentally retarded
son in the specially selected home in accordance with the recommendation
of the psychiatrist in charge of the son's case, for the purpose of helping
the son adjust from life in a mental hospital to life in the community, are
expenses for medical care within the meaning of Section 213 of the Code.""2
Revenue Ruling 72-226 further provided "that amounts actually paid by
the taxpayer to maintain his dependent in a therapeutic center for drug
addicts including the cost of the dependent's meals and lodging at the center
which were furnished as a necessary incident to his treatment, are expenses
for medical care under Section 213 of the Code." 3 Revenue Ruling 73-325
held that "amounts paid by the taxpayer to the therapeutic center for alco-
holism, including the cost of the taxpayer's meals and lodging at the center
which are furnished as a necessary incident to his treatment, are expenses
for medical care ... ."' Therefore, in order to be entitled to a medical
60 6 P-H 1977 FED. TAXES 55,446.
61 Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(1)(v)(a).
62 Rev. Rul. 69-499, 1969-2 CuM. BULL. 39 at 40.
63 Rev. Rul. 72-226, 1972-1 CuM. BULL. 97.
64 Rev. Rul. 73-325, 1973-2 CuM. BULL. 75.
Fall, 1977]
13
et al.: Federal Income Tax Developments: 1977
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1978
AKRON LAW REVIEW
deduction for food and lodging expenses for institutional care at halfway
houses the taxpayer must establish that the home is intended to improve
mental or physical health, that the cost of the meals and lodging are necessary
to that mental or physical health, and that the particular institution was
recommended by a doctor.
4.04 Medical Expense - Organic Foods
Revenue Ruling 55-26111 established that generally the cost of special
food or beverages does not qualify as a deductible medical expense under
Section 213. "However, in special cases, depending upon the particular facts
presented, if the prescribed food or beverage is taken solely for the allevia-
tion or treatment of an illness, is in no way a part of the nutritional needs
of the patient, and a statement as to the particular facts and to the food and
beverage prescribed is submitted by a physician, the cost of such food or
beverage may be deducted as a medical expense." 6 The Tax Court recently
found such special circumstances in Therou G. Randolph" where it allowed
the taxpayer a medical expense deduction for the added cost of special
organic foods necessary to alleviate their allergic reactions to chemically
treated or packaged foods.
The taxpayers, Therou and Janet Randolph, were allergic to chemical
compounds found in herbicides, pesticides, various synthetics, hydrochemicals
and petrochemicals. Many of these chemical compounds were used in the
growing, preparation and packaging of food products. Whenever Mrs. Ran-
dolph ate any contaminated food, she reacted with mental confusion, crossed
eyes, walking difficulty and, within minutes, unconsciousness. Mr. Randolph,
himself a doctor specializing in allergies, determined that the reactions he
and his wife suffered from could be substantially controlled by a diet limited
to organic foods. Three unrelated doctors agreed with the diagnosis of
Doctor Randolph.
The petitioners purchased their food at various health food stores that
sell specially grown, transported, packaged and marketed food. The special
handling of the food results in a higher retail cost than non-organically
grown and prepared food. As a result, the taxpayers on their 1971 income
tax return deducted as a medical expense $3,086, which represented the
extra cost incurred by the taxpayers in purchasing organic food over the
cost of non-organic food. The Service assessed a deficiency disallowing the
deduction and this action ensued.
The Tax Court pointed out that since the taxpayers suffered from
65 Rev. Rul. 55-261, 1955-1 CuM. BULL. 307.
66 Rev. Rul. 55-261, 1955-1 CuM. BULL. 307 at 312.
67 67 T.C. No. 35 (Dec. 16, 1976).
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chemical allergies that could be controlled only by limiting their diet to
chemically uncontaminated foods, "the additional charges incurred in adher-
ing to their medically required diet are deductible medical expenses."6 s The
Tax Court determined that the additional expenses incurred in obtaining
the organic food meet the definition of a deductible medical expense estab-
lished in Edward A. Harvey. 9 "To be a deductible medical expense, there
must be a direct or proximate relation between the expense and the diagnosis,
cure, mitigation, treatment or prevention of disease or the expense must have
been incurred for the purpose of affecting some structure or function of the
body."' The Tax Court emphasized that the taxpayers were only entitled to
deduct the extra costs incurred in acquiring the organic foods. "Had there
been no added charge for special handling, petitioners would not be allowed
a medical expense deduction."'" The Tax Court remained consistent with its
earlier opinions rendered in J. Willard Harris"' and Leo R. Cohn." In
J. Willard Harris the taxpayer was medically required to limit his intake of
sugar. The Tax Court therein denied a medical expense deduction for the
cost of specially artificially sweetened food when it was not shown that the
foods were more expensive than their nondietic counterparts. In Leo R. Cohn
the taxpayer was required to maintain a salt free diet and the Tax Court
allowed a medical deduction for the additional costs incurred by the tax-
payer who was charged more than ordinary customers by restaurants for
preparing his meals without salt.
4.05 Spouse's Traveling Expense
Under Section 162 (a) (2), travel expenses while away from home are
deductible expenses. However, such deductions are allowable only to the
extent that they are reasonable and necessary to the taxpayers' business. "
Thus, even though the employee himself meets that requirement, any reim-
bursement for the travel expenses of his spouse who accompanies him are not
deductible unless it can be clearly shown by the taxpayer that the spouse's
presence served a bona fide purpose at the convention."9
68 Id. at 257.
69 12 T.C. 409 (1949).
70 Id. at 421.
7167 T.C. No. 35 at 257 (Dec. 16, 1976).
7246 T.C. 672 (1966).
73 38 T.C. 387 (1962).
T4Treas. Reg. § 1.162(a).
75 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2(c). See Rev. Rul. 64-9, 1964-1 CuM. BULL. 65. See also Weatherford
v. United States, 418 F.2d 895, 897 (9th Cir. 1969) (travel expenses for accompaniment
of wheat farmer's wife to the Orient denied when the purpose for her travel was her non-
business desire to be with her husband); Sheldon v. Commissioner, 299 F.2d 48, 49 (7th
Cir. 1962) (travel expense for accompaniment of insurance salesman's wife to conventions
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In Bank of Stockton,"6 the plaintiff employer claimed that its reimburse-
ment of travel expenses for the accompaniment of employees' wives to certain
conventions were deductible business expenses. Since the bank's transactions
included euro-dollars, leveraged leases, and correspondent loan transactions,
the plaintiff maintained that close personal contacts between their officers
and other banks were essential to business. These contacts were cultivated
by encouraging Stockton's employees to participate in various banking asso-
ciations, including the American Bankers Association, California Bankers
Association, and the Independent Bankers Association. For many years,
any employee who was selected to attend a convention was required to take
his wife if the convention registered wives as participants. At such conven-
tions the wives were to cultivate contacts by having social functions and by
serving as hostesses in hospitality rooms. In order to learn more about bank-
ing, they also attended special and general delegate sessions. Included in the
bank's 1971 and 1972 tax returns were deductions for the wives' travel
expenses to such conventions.
The Service disallowed those deductions for the convention expenses
of wives of employees who were shareholders in the bank, of the president,
and of three vice-presidents. However, it allowed the deductions for the wives
of non-shareholders and for the wife of a bank shareholder who was also
president of the Independent Bankers Association.
The Tax Court held that the convention expenses for wives of employees
who were either shareholders or non-shareholders were fully deductible. In
effect, the Service was claiming that the reimbursed expenses for the wives
of shareholders were disguised dividends." The court, however, concluded
that such a disguise was not present in this case since there was no direct
relation between convention expenses and the stockholdings. In fact, a major-
ity of those who attended the conventions with their wives were non-share-
holders. The court also noted that the deducted expenses were ordinary and
necessary to the taxpayer's business, since the wives had a bona fide purpose
in attending the convention: education and the continuation of social con-
tacts.'8
4.06 Employee Travel Expense - Service's New View
Travel expenses incurred by a taxpayer in going from home to a
7646 P-H TAX Cr. MEM. 1 77,024 (1977).
77 A closely held corporation or an individual corporation is usually suspect of disguising
dividends in similar cases. See Challenge Manufacturing Co., 37 T.C. 650 (1962) where the
court denied a deduction for a wife's accompaniment when the husband-taxpayer was sole
shareholder. However, in Stockton the shares were widely distributed.
78 Bank of Stockton, 46 P-H TAx Cr. MEM. T 77,024 at 119 (1977). See also United States
v. Disney, 413 F.2d 783, 786-8 (9th Cir. 1969) (wife's accompaniment for purpose of good-
will resulted in a deductible travel expense).
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temporary job located outside of the locus of his principal employment have
generally been deductible expenses. 9 If the taxpayer was reimbursed for
such expenses, then the payment would not be considered wages."' Thus, a
construction worker's travel allowance to a distant and temporary location
would not usually be subject to social security and withholding taxes.
However, in a recent revenue ruling,"1 the Service changed its policy.
Any expenses for transportation between the taxpayer's home and place of
business, even though temporary, are now considered non-deductible com-
muting expenses (as of January 1, 1977). If the taxpayer is reimbursed for
such expenses, then the full reimbursement is subject to social security and
withholding taxes.
This revenue ruling does not affect the taxpayer who in the course of
one day drove from his home to an airport, flew to a business meeting, and
then returned directly home. 2 Also not affected is the taxpayer who drives
from his principal place of business, also his home, to other places of employ-
ment."3
Due to problems with implementation, the Service extended the effec-
tive date of this revenue ruling from January 1, 1977 to April 1, 1977.84
Subsequently, the Service extended the effective date from April 1, 1977 to
July 1, 197785 and, again, from July 1, 1977 to October 1, 1977.88 Most
recently, the effective date of Revenue Ruling 76-453 has been suspended
indefinitely. ' To invite public comments within this area, proposed treasury
regulations are to be issued shortly.8
4.07 Home Away From Home - Temporary Employment
In Benjamin G. Bochner,"9 the taxpayer appealed an Internal Revenue
Service finding which disallowed his deduction on his 1971 tax return of
$9,323.96 for travel expenses, including laundry, lodging and meals. The
taxpayer, an engineer, had rented a furnished apartment at Glendora, Cali-
fornia since 1957. He occupied the apartment until January, 1971 when,
eleven months after his termination from a local corporation, he obtained
79 Rev. Rul. 53-190, 1953-2 CUM. BuLL. 303.
so Id.
81 Rev. Rul. 76-453, 1976-2 CuM. BULL. 86.
821d. at 87.
88 Id.
84 Announcement 77-113, INT. REV. BULL. No. 28 at 18.
85 d. Announcement 77-23, INT. REV. BULL. No. 7 at 31.
88 Announcement 77-113, INT. REV. BULL. No. 28 at 18.
87 Announcement 77-147, INT. REV. BULL. No. 42 at 45.
88 Id.
89 67 T.C. 824 (1977).
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temporary employment in Richland, Washington. He rented an apartment
and resided in Richland through May, 1971. On June 4, 1971, he obtained
temporary employment in Boston, Massachusetts. He rented an apartment
and resided in Boston through September, 1971. In November, the taxpayer
again obtained temporary employment and moved to a rented apartment in
Richland where he resided throughout the remainder of 1971. In January,
1972, he obtained permanent employment with another firm in Richland
and ceased renting the Glendora apartment.
The taxpayer claimed that he kept his apartment in Glendora because
of his desire to remain and work there. Since he found various temporary
employments outside of Glendora during 1971, he maintained that he was
away from home as required under Section 162 (a) (2). The Service agreed
only that the taxpayer's various employments were temporary. The Service
maintained that since the taxpayer had no substantial ties with Glendora, he
carried his tax home "on his back."9 Accordingly, under Section 262, any
expenses associated with the Glendora apartment would be nondeductible
personal expenses.
In rejecting the taxpayer's claim, the Tax Court noted that a person
is usually expected to have his tax home near his place of employment.91
Under Section 162 (a) (2), however, certain living expenses are deductible
if a person is temporarily employed in an area away from home.9" But, as
a condition precedent to being "away from home," the Tax Court required
the existence of a home in which the taxpayer had substantial connections
with the community. 3 In this instance, the Tax Court found the taxpayer
lacking family, business and even personal presence in Glendora subsequent
to January, 1971. The mere desire of the taxpayer to regain employment in
Glendora and his subsequent rental payments there were not enough to
establish Glendora as his tax home. If such were the case, the new test for
one's tax home would be where the taxpayer's heart lies." Under such
criteria, a multitude could use Section 162 (a) (2) to deduct as living
expenses those items that have traditionally been regarded as personal living
expenses under Section 261.
4.08 Suspension of Professional Practice - Deductions Lost
An individual or corporate taxpayer is "allowed as a deduction, all the
90 See Kenneth H. Hicks, 47 T.C. 71 (1966).
91 See Emil J. Michaels, 53 T.C. 269 (1969).
92 Peurifoy v. Commissioner, 358 U.S. 59, 60 (1958).
93 Benjamin G. Bochner, 67 T.C. 824, at 438-67 (1977) citing James v. United States, 308
F.2d 204 (9th Cir. 1962) (a continuous permanent residence and continuous living
expenses).
9 4Id. See also Frank D. Scotten, 35 P-H TAx Cr. MEM. 66,206 at 1189 (1966), aff'd,
391 F.2d 274 (5th Cir. 1968).
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ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in
carrying on a trade or business ...."" For the taxpayer engaged in a pro-
fessional trade, this deduction can include education,"8 convention," and
supply 8 expenses. However, when the taxpayer has indefinitely suspended
his practice, are such expenses still deductible? In Revenue Ruling 77-32,""
the Service declared that in such a situation those expenses do not relate
to the carrying on of an existing trade or business. That ruling was the result
of an anesthesiologist's request to deduct the expenses of maintaining certain
supplies and retaining his professional skills through educational meetings
and conventions even though he had indefinitely suspended his practice due
to the cost of professional liability insurance. Since there was no active trade,
the Service said that such expenses were non-deductible expenses of prepara-
tion for some unknown future return to business."'
4.09 Research Expenses
Section 174'1' allows the taxpayer a deduction for research and experi-
mental expenses. This deduction includes a wide variety of expenses, ranging
from travel costs for research in writing a book"' to development,' patent, "
production,' promotion,"' and demonstration'" costs. However, research
and experimental expenses are deductible only if they are made by the tax-
payer "in connection with his trade or business ... ."I08 Thus, a corporation
in the lock business was able to deduct expenditures for the research and
development of locks.""
In Snow v. Commissioner,"" the Supreme Court held that an inventor
in a limited partnership could deduct research costs, even though there was
95 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 162(a).
96 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(a) (1) (when the education will improve skills required by taxpayer's
trade). For a discussion of the regulations and cases governing the deduction of educational
expenses as business expenses, see Briner, Federal Income Tax Development: 1976, 10 AKRON
L. REV. 395, 404-07 (1977).
97 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2(c),(d) (if attendance benefits taxpayer's trade).
98 ld. § 1.162-6 (supplies, rent, maintenance, and assets of short life).
99 Rev. Rul. 77-32, 1977 INT. REV. BULL. No. 6 at 5.
100 Id.
101 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 174.
102 Sterm v. United States, 27 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 71-1149 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
103 Paterson v. United States, 122 F. Supp. 770, 772 (S.D. Ala. 1954).
104 Johan A. Louw, 40 P-H TAx CT. MEM 1 71,326 (Dec. 27, V.'1).
105 Nicholas A. Dodich, 40 P-H TAx CT. MEM. 71,058 (Mar. 29, 1971).
106 Id.
107 See Kenneth Reiner, 34 P-H TAx CT. MEM. 65-197 (Jul. 20, 1965).
108 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 174(a)(1).
109 Best Universal Lock Co., 45 T.C. 1 (1965).
120 416 U.S. 502 (1974). For an analysis and commentary, see Briner, Federal Income Tax
Developments: 1974, 8 AKRON L. REv. 206, 224 (1975).
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neither a marketable product nor an active business. The Court ruled that
deductions for research would not be limited to the requirements or ordinary
and necessary business expenses. All that was required was that the taxpayer
be connected in some manner in his trade or business with the research
expenditures. Mr. Snow was connected to the research by his trade or business
since he had invested money as a limited partner.11'
In Eugene v. Magee,"2 the Tax Court found that a painter could deduct
research and development costs for a portable scaffold since the taxpayer's
scaffold was used in connection with his trade. Mr. Magee was employed as
a painter for a university. The university provided him with ladders and
other equipment. However, since he was given permission by the university
to use his portable scaffold when painting, his use of his invention was a
sufficient "connection with his trade or business" for the Tax Court. A tax-
payer has also been able to deduct research costs when he was in the business
of inventing."'
The taxpayer-inventor in Joseph M. Kaspar'" had invested neither as
a limited partner nor in the business. He did not even use his invention in
his trade. He was a diesel machinist who invented in his spare time a device
for extracting raw meat from spring lobsters. After developing his invention
in 1965, Mr. Kaspar tried to sell, license, or franchise his device for eight
years. During those years, he obtained a United States patent and eighteen
foreign patents for his lobster meat extractor. Failing to market his invention,
he sold all of his foreign patent rights for a small sum.1" He netted that
amount against the cost of obtaining the patents"6 and claimed an ordinary
business loss. The Internal Revenue Service maintained that the loss on the
sale of the patents was not an ordinary business loss, but a long-term capital
loss.
The Tax Court supported the Service in disallowing the taxpayer an
ordinary business loss of $23,180.34. Unlike Mr. Snow, who had invested
as a partner with a professional inventor, Mr. Kaspar had no connection
with the trade of inventing. The court reasoned that there was no business
that could incur the patent expenses. Furthermore, the court held that the
taxpayer's expenditures for his invention were capital expenses, thus, increas,
-11 The Court did not explore the application of "hobby-losses." Snow v. Commissioner,
416 U.S. 502, 504 (1974).
112 P-H TAx CT. MEM. 73,271 (Dec. 10, 1973).
113 See Johan A. Louw, 40 P-H TAx CT. MEM. 71,326 (Dec. 27, 1971).
114 45 P-H TAx CT. MEM. 76,389 (Dec. 31, 1976).
115 The selling price was $2010.00, thereby resulting in a significant economic loss to the
taxpayer. id. at 1734.
116The taxpayer claimed a cost of $27,060.34, consisting of production, travel, attorney,
stationery, and incidental expenses. Id.
[Vol. 11:2
20
Akron Law Review, Vol. 11 [1978], Iss. 2, Art. 2
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol11/iss2/2
FEDERAL INCOME TAx DEVELOPMENTS: 1977
ing his basis in the patents. Since the basis of a patent is depreciable, " the
basis must be adjusted for the amount of depreciation." 8 Therefore, the court
determined that the taxpayer's basis was $2,010, there being no long-term
gain or loss on the patent sales.
Even if the taxpayer had a sufficient connection between his trade or
business and his research expenses, he would have faced the same results
under the Kaspar facts. As the Tax Court observed in a footnote, the tax-
payer neglected to defer the research expenses." 9 Since the taxpayer did not
deduct the research expenses as they were paid or incurred, he had the option
to amortize or capitalize them. "' Having failed to elect his option, the
taxpayer must capitalize his research and experimental expenses."'
4.10 Alimony Payments
Under Section 215122 a taxpayer may deduct"' payments which are
described in Section 71"' as includible in the spouse's gross income as ali-
mony." 5 To qualify as alimony, these payments must be recognized in either
a divorce decree or a separation agreement "because of the marital or family
relationship .... "-"6 Furthermore, these payments must be periodic;'
although in order to be periodic, they need not be made at regular intervals."'
When the taxpayer makes a lump sum payment of alimony, generally no
part of that payment is deductible by the taxpayer. 1 29
In George M. Curley,"' the taxpayer entered into a separation agree-
ment which required a funding through an escrow agent for the distribution
of weekly alimony payments, a lump sum, and a "sum of $10,000 as addi-
tional alimony to enable the wife to cover certain legal and other ex-
117 Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-6(a).
'Is See INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1016(a)(2).
119 Joseph M. Kaspar, 45 P-H TAx CT. MEM. $ 76,389 at 1735 n.9 (Dec. 31, 1976).
120Treas. Reg. § 1.174-1.
121 Id.
122 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 215.
123 The taxpayer who uses the standard deduction may now also deduct alimony payments.
For a commentary and explanation, see Briner, Federal Income Tax Developments; 1976, 10
AKRON L. REV. 393, 477 (1977).
124 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 71.
125 Section 71(b) expressly excluded support payments for minor children from its definition
of INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 7 1(b). See Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(e).
'
2 6INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 71(a)(1).
127 Id.
128 Treas. Reg. § 1.17-1(b).
129 This statement is based on the assumption that the lump sum payment included no ar-
rearages. If arrearages were included in the lump sum, then the amount of the arrearages
would be deductible. Rev. Rul. 55-457, 1955-2 CuM. BULL. 527. See generally Rev. Rul.
67-11, 1967-1 CuM. BULL. 15.
130 45 P-H TAx CT. MEM. 76,398 (Dec. 28, 1976).
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penses ... ."I" The monthly alimony began at the time of the separation,
but the lump sum and the sum of "additional alimony" were not to be
distributed until the divorce was granted. The wife's death would, however,
cause the immediate cessation of any further obligations. Within six months
the divorce was granted, and the escrow agent paid the lump sum and the
additional sum of $10,000 to the wife. The taxpayer claimed a deduction
for the monthly alimony payments and the additional sum of $10,000 in
alimony.
The Internal Revenue Service maintained that the $10,000 sum of
"additional alimony" failed to qualify as alimony under Section 71 and,
therefore, was not deductible under Section 215. The Service's position was
that the additional amount was the payment of a principal sum to cover
legal fees rather than the payment of alimony. The Tax Court accepted the
Service's argument. Noting that labels are descriptive rather than determina-
tive, the court rejected the taxpayer's argument that the language of the
separation agreement controlled in naming the $10,000 as "additional ali-
mony." Whether or not the additional sum was alimony depended upon the
facts. In this case, the sum in question was paid in a single payment. The
court observed that in its ordinary meaning, the word, "periodic," in Section
71 would exclude single or lump sum payments.
The court also rejected the taxpayer's argument that since the payment
of the additional sum had been subject to the contingency of his wife's death
prior to the settlement of the escrow, the payment must have been an allow-
able deduction under Treasury Regulation 1.71-1 (d) (3).111 That regulation
provides that installment payments over less than ten years would be con-
sidered periodic if the payments were subject to the contingency of the
spouse's death. The court again emphasized the word, "periodic," concluding
that the treasury regulation applied only to installments, which are payments
of a periodic nature rather than lump sums. 3 ' A lump sum payment of
"additional alimony" could not be made periodic by making it contingent
upon the death of the spouse.
4.11 Forfeiture of Gambling Devices
Under Section 165 an individual or corporate taxpayer is "allowed as
a deduction any loss sustained during the taxable year and not compensated
for by insurance or otherwise."'34 Such deductions are not denied merely
because the taxpayer sustained the loss while engaged in an illegal activity.'85
is' Id. at 1772.
"32Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(d)(3).
183 See generally Statapatas v. Commissioner, 446 F.2d 79, 82 (7th Cir. 1971).
234 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 165(a).
1" See Edwards v. Bromberg, 232 F.2d 107, 111 (5th Cir. 1956). See generally Commissioner
v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27 (1958).
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However, in Revenue Ruling 77-126,"11 the Service ruled that the for-
feiture of gambling devices is not a deductible loss when the machines were
seized because of the taxpayer's non-payment of excise taxes'" on the de-
vitks. The Service took the position that since the courts have denied the
deduction for business fines under Section 162 for public policy reasons,"3 8
the losses under Section 165 for the forfeiture of unlawful gambling devices
should also be denied due to public policy considerations. Although Congress
amended Section 162 (c) 39 and added Sections 162 (f)'" and (g)... to
delineate public policy, the Service considered these changes codifications
of the courts' policy under Section 162, and not limitations upon the applica-
tion of public policy under Section 165. The Service concluded that public
policy denies the deduction for the loss of gambling machines once the
devices have been forfeited." 2 However, prior to the seizure of these devices,
the taxpayer may still deduct any losses sustained in a sale of the gambling
machines."'
4.12 Section 6651 Penalty - Not Deductible as Interest
Section 163 allows the taxpayer a business or personal deduction for
"all interest paid or accrued within the taxable year.""' Interest has been
defined as the compensation for the use of money. '" However, when the tax-
payer has been assessed the 0.5 percent monthly penalty for not paying his
taxes,' is that penalty a deductible interest cost for the use of the tax
money owed?
In Francis J. May,"' the taxpayer was assesed a penalty under Section
6651 (a) (2) for her delinquent pre-1970 income taxes. In 1972, she paid
the delinquent tax and penalty, including the penalty on her return as an
interest deduction. The Service disallowed the deduction of the penalty
as interest.
The Tax Court agreed with the Service and noted that the penalty
assessed by Section 6651 (a) (2) was not interest since the penalty could
136 Rev. Rul. 77-126, 1977 INT. REV. BULL. No. 17 at 10.
137 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 4461.
13s E.g., Tank Truck Rental, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958).
119 Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, § 3 10(a), 85 Stat. 525; Tax Reform Act
of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 902(b), 83 Stat. 710.
140 Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 902(a), 83 Stat. 710.
41 d.
142 Rev. Rul. 77-126, 1977 INT. REV. BULL. No. 17 at 10.
'4' Rev. Rul. 74-531, 1974-2 CuM. BULL. 268.
144 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 163(a).
145 See Deputy v. DuPont, 308 U.S. 488, 498 (1940); Shealy v. United States, 37 F.2d
918, 919 (W.D.S.C. 1930).
146 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 6651(a) (2).
147 65 T.C. No. 94 (Mar. 10, 1976).
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have been avoided if the taxpayer would have shown reasonable cause for
the delay in paying her taxes. Interest is distinguished as compensation for
the use of the money, while a penalty is compensation for the failure to pay
money on the due date.1"8 The court also stated that to reward a taxpayer
with a deduction for such penalties would frustrate public policy.1""
5.00 Tax Credits
6.00 Depreciation
6.01 Accelerated Depreciation - Good Faith Adoption of Wrong Rate
The depreciation method 1 ' used by the taxpayer determines the rate
of depreciation deductions available throughout the life of the asset. Section
167 (c) restricts the use of all such methods except the straight line method.15'
For instance, the double declining balance method 52 would not be available
to the taxpayer unless he was the original user of the property.'53 Once the
method of depreciation has been adopted by the taxpayer, there usually can-
not be a change of method unless the Service first consents to the change. 5'
The Service generally has refused to permit a taxpayer who, in good faith,
adopted a wrong method to change to the next fastest method available.
In Buddy Schoellkopf Products, Inc.,"5 the taxpayer purchased a used
airplane in 1964 and claimed depreciation deductions based on the double
declining balance method. The Service denied these depreciation deductions
on the taxpayer's 1968 and 1969 tax returns since the taxpayer was not the
original owner of the plane. The taxpayer agreed that the use of the double
declining method to depreciate the used plane was incorrect and recalcu-
lated his deductions using the 150 percent declining balance method.' 8 The
Service, however, also denied the use of that method and required the tax-
payer to use the straight line method only. The Tax Court rejected the
Service's argument that the taxpayer could not elect the 150 percent declining
148 d. at 626-27.
1 Id. at 627.
150 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 167(b) (includes the straight line, declining balance, sum of
the digits, and other methods).
"5 The straight line method simply provides for the deduction of a constant amount each
year calculated by dividing the adjusted basis of the item, less salvage value, by the esti-
mated life of the property.
152 The double declining balance method allows the taxpayer to apply a rate of two times
the straight line rate to a declining adjusted basis of the item thereby permitting him to
receive a much larger deduction in the initial years of the item's life than available under
normal methods.
353 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 167(c)(2).
'
5 4 See INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 167(c)(2).
15565 T.C. 640 (1975).
'
56 The 150 percent method permits the deduction of a constant rate, one-and-a-half times
the straight line rate, from the declining adjusted basis of the.item.
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balance method over the straight line method without the permission of the
Service. It was noted by the court that the mistaken, yet good faith, use of the
double declining method produced excessive depreciation deductions for the
taxpayer's 1965, 1966, and 1967 tax returns. Those mistakes were not cor-
rectable since the statute of limitations had run. However, to allow the Service
to compensate for the taxpayer's mistake by restricting him to the straight
line method would result in a slower recovery of investment, thereby negating
the intent of Sections 167 (b) and (c), which allow a choice of calculations
for the taxpayer's reasonable allowance of depreciation. 5 '
The Service initially refused to fully acquiesce in the Schoellkopf deci-
sion and adopted an intermediate position that allowed a taxpayer to select
any proper depreciation method within a year of the initial mistake by filing
an amended return." 8 Now, however, the Service has adopted the Schoellkopt
result" 9 and recognizes that even if the Service discovers the error after the
statute of limitations has run, the taxpayer cannot subsequently be forced
to use only the straight line method when others are available. However, if
the taxpayer initially knew that the depreciation method was wrong, the
outcome could be different.
7.00 Gains and Losses
7.01 Installment Sales of Partnership Interest
Under Section 453,10 the taxpayer is allowed to use the installment
method as an alternative to the cash or accrual method for the reporting of
gain from the sale of property. Each installment payment that is received by
the taxpayer consists oif a portion of a return of his basis and a portion of
the gain realized on the transaction.' 6' Thus, by using the installment plan,
the taxpayer has been able to defer the income tax impact arising from the
sale of property through the years during which the payments were received.
Any taxpayer may take advantage of the installment method for the
reporting of the casual sale of personal or real property' if the selling price
157 See Silver Queen Motel, 55 T.C. 1101 (1971).
158 Rev. Rul. 72-491, 1972-2 CUM. BULL. 104.
159 1977 INT. REV. BULL. No. 10 at 5 acquiescing in Buddy Schoellkopf Products, Inc. 65
T.C. 640 (1975).
I(o INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 453.
161 See Treas. Reg. § 1.453-1(b)(1). For example, assume a taxpayer sold his property for
$10,000. His basis was $5,000. There was a downpayment of $2,000, with the remainder
to be paid over four years. The taxpayer's gross profit was $5,000 (total contract price
less his basis). Thus, the ratio that had to be reported was 50 percent (5,000/10,000) of
the payments. In other words, he would report as income 50 percent of each payment
received, and the remaining 50 percent would be tax-free return of his basis (assuming
there was no recapture).
162 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 453(b)(1). A taxpayer who regularly sells personal property
on the installment plan may also use the installment method to report his gains. INT. REV.
CODE of 1954, § 453(a); Treas. Reg. 1.453-1(a).
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exceeds $1,000, and if the payments received from the buyer in the taxable
year of the sale did not exceed 30 percent of the selling price." 3 The tax-
payer's selling price is determined by including the gross amount of the
purchaser's obligation and income accessions included under Section 61.""'
All payments, other than evidences of the purchaser's indebtedness are in-
cluded for the determination of the 30 percent ceiling.
Assume, for example, that Blackacre was sold in a casual sale for
$50,000, with $30,000 as a down payment and the remainder to be paid
over the next four years. Also, the buyer assumed a $50,000 mortgage that
had been on Blackacre. Since the selling price was $100,000 (the purchaser's
total obligation, $50,000, plus the transfer of the mortgage, $50,000), the
selling price was obviously in excess of $1,000 and the $30,000 payment
in the taxable year was not in excess of 30 percent of the selling price.
In Revenue Ruling 76-483,"' the Internal Revenue Service responded
to a taxpayer's question concerning the computation of the 30 percent ceiling.
The taxpayer had sold his interest in a partnership for $20,000, with $8,000
as a down payment and the remainder to be paid over the next six years.
The Service ruled that the taxpayer had not violated the 30 percent rule,
since the buyer had also assumed $80,000 of the taxpayer's partnership
liabilities. Clearly the $8,000 down payment exceeded 30 percent of the
buyer's contract price of $20,000, but that was of no importance since the
30 percent test was applied only to the selling price. 6' Therefore, the $8,000
down payment was less than 30 percent of the $100,000 selling price.
8.00. Procedure
8.01 Tax on Marriage Upheld
One of the major criticisms of the present tax system is the so-called
"tax on marriage" which results in a higher tax liability for married couples
filing jointly where both parties have significant incomes, than the tax that
would be imposed if each spouse has been able to file a separate return
using the rates applied to single persons. Johnson v. United States'" is the
most recent of a series of cases attacking the validity of the "tax on marriage."
In that case which consolidated the claims of three taxpayers, a federal district
court upheld the tax, thereby rejecting the taxpayers' arguments that the
differential rates of Sections 1 (a) and 1 (c) violated fifth amendment due
163 TNT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 453(b)(2); Treas. Reg. 1.453-1(c). The installment method
would also apply if no payments were made in the taxable year of the sale. Id.
164 I NT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 61(a).
165 Rev. Rul. 76-483, 1976-2 CuM. BuiL. 131.
16G See generally Treas. Reg. 1.453-4(b).
167 38 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 76-6176 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 24, 1976).
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process rights and imposed an unconstitutional burden on the fundamental
right to marry.
The Barters and Blairs, two of the married claimants in Johnson, each
filed joint returns for 1971 using the tax rates in Section 1 (a) for married
persons filing jointly. Both couples paid their respective tax liabilities in full
but subsequently filed claims for a refund with the Service.
The claimed refunds reflected the difference in the amount of taxes
actually paid using the tax rates for married couples and the amount that
would have been paid if each had been allowed to use the tax rate schedule
for single persons. The Service denied the refund claims of both couples and
court action ensued.
The plaintiffs specifically attacked the rate schedules of Section 1 con-
tending that since they are based on the marital status of the taxpayer, they
are unconstitutional in that they violate the first, fourth, fifth, ninth and
tenth amendments. The plaintiffs maintained that the Due Process Clause
of the fifth amendment forbids tax rate differentiation based on marital
status and that the free exercise provision of the first amendment prohibits
the imposition of higher taxes on those who marry because of religious
beliefs. Also, the taxpayers contended that the higher taxes imposed on a
married person violated one's right to marry protected by the first, fourth,
fifth, ninth and tenth amendments.
Section 303 of the Revenue Act of 1948168 first permitted married
couples to split their income and file joint returns. This section resulted from
a congressional attempt to equalize the taxes imposed on married couples.
Prior to 1948, the amount of tax liability on married couples depended
largely on whether the couple lived in a community property state or a non-
community property state. Before 1948, the rate structure of the Internal
Revenue Code did not differentiate between taxpayers on the basis of their
marital status. Married couples in community property states enjoyed a tax
advantage over married couples in non-community property states because
in some community property states earnings and income were treated as
belonging equally to both husband and wife regardless of who actually
earned them. Given the progressive rate schedule, married couples in
community property states could substantially lower their tax liability by
splitting their income. The Supreme Court upheld this method of income
splitting in Poe v. Seaborn.16 9
After the decision in Poe, state legislatures in non-community property
16826 U.S.C. § 51(b) (1939).
169282 U.S. 101 (1930).
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states, in an attempt to reduce the taxes of their residents, began enacting
community property laws. Congress responded to these actions by including
the joint return provision for married persons in the Revenue Act of 1948,
therefore giving an income splitting benefit to all married taxpayers. Although
there remained only one tax rate, a married couple's income was calculated
as if each spouse had earned one half of the total amount.
This method of income splitting continued in effect until Congress
responded to the heavy tax burden imposed on single individuals by estab-
lishing the present system of four tax rate schedules in the Tax Reform Act
of 1969.1° Before 1969, some single individual's tax liability was 40 per-
cent greater' 71 than the tax imposed on married persons with comparable
income. After the Tax Reform Act of 1969, at no equivalent level of income
does the tax paid by a single individual exceed by more than 20 percent
the tax paid by a married couple. However, these changes in the tax rates
had another effect especially in those cases where both spouses have signifi-
cant income; the taxes paid when filing a joint return exceed the taxes paid
by two single individuals with the same total income. This "tax on marriage"
formed the basis of the taxpayers' claims in the Johnson case.
The court rejected the taxpayers' fifth amendment due process argu-
ments pertaining to the aggregation of married couples' income. The tax-
payers argued that when filing a joint return the couples' income must be
aggregated and, therefore, subjected to higher marginal tax rates. The court
concluded that "any aggregation of the two spouses' income in a joint return
is purely a voluntary matter"' 2 and "the fact remains that each married tax-
payer may make the individual choice to file a separate return .... ,,"
The plaintiffs' second due process argument, that the tax rates uncon-
stitutionally burden a married working female, was based on the assumption
that the wife's income is secondary to that of her husband's and, therefore,
due to aggregation, her husband's marginal tax rate became her minimum
tax rate. The court rejected this argument largely because of what in essense
was found to be a faulty assumption. The court reasoned that a wife's income
is not always secondary to that of her husband's and, as a result, "the federal
tax schedule at issue here cannot be said to burden all women, if indeed
any are so burdened."''"
The court did, however, accept the plaintiffs' argument that the tax
170 Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487.
171 S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. reprinted in [1969] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
at 2030-203 1.
172 38 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d at 76-6183 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 24, 1976).
173 ld. at 76-6182.
1741d. at 76-618 ,
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rates infringed upon the constitutional right to marry; but the court main-
tained that due to compelling governmental interests this infringement was
justified. The court decided that the government had legitimate legislative
goals in enacting the Tax Reform Act of 1969 which established the present
four tax rate schedules. Those goals include reducing the tax differential be-
tween married and single taxpayers, reaffirming a policy that married
couples with the same aggregate income should pay the same amount of
taxes, and raising revenue. These goals coupled with "the inherently complex
nature of legislative decisions in the field of taxation"1"5 "justify any in-
cidental burden on the plaintiffs.' 1 7 6
8.02 Unreasonable Searches - Corporation's Rights
The United State Supreme Court in General Motors Leasing Corp. v.
United StatesIT unanimously ruled that the warrantless entry by Internal
Revenue Service officers into the petitioner's corporate office violated the
corporation's fourth amendment rights against invasion of privacy and un-
reasonable searches and seizures. The court flatly rejected a government
argument that warrantless entries and invasion of privacy were permitted
under Section 6331 for the enforcement of tax laws. The court concluded
that Section 6331 authorized all forms of seizure by any means but that it
was silent on the subject of invasions of privacy. The intrusion into the
petitioner's office is therefore governed by the normal fourth amendment
rule that "except in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search of
private property without proper consent is 'unreasonable' unless it has been
authorized by a valid search warrant."1 8
The petitioner, General Motors Leasing Corp., had as its general
manager, George I. Norman, Jr. In 1971 Norman was tried and convicted
on two counts of bank fraud which were subsequently affirmed by the
Tenth Circuit. Norman filed a questionable joint income return for 1970
after four extensions of time for filing had been granted, but failed to file
at all for calendar year 1971. After Norman's convictions, the Service
assigned the Norman accounts for 1970 and 1971 for investigation. Norman
disappeared when the time came for him. to begin serving his sentence in
March 1973 and immediately thereafter the Service ascertained that Norman
was deficient in the amount of $406,099.34 for 1970 and $543,310.59 for
1971. Because of Norman's fugitive status and his failure to file appropriate
returns, the deficiencies were considered to be in jeopardy and were assessed
immediately pursuant to Section 6861.
175 Id. at 76-6185.
176 Id. at 76-6189.
177 97 S. Ct. 619 (1977).
1 7 8 Id. at 631, quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. at 528 (1967).
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The next day revenue agents called on the Norman residence and de-
manded payment of the assessed taxes. Mrs. Norman referred the agents
to her attorney. At the Norman house the agents observed several luxury
automobiles in the driveway and later learned that some of these automobiles
were registered in the name of the petitioner, General Motors Leasing Corp.
An investigation of the corporate entity revealed facts from which the
revenue agents determined that the petitioner corporation was not engaged in
any business activity, but instead was Norman's alter ego and that some of
its assets were his personal assets. Therefore, on March 21, the agents seized,
without a warrant, several automobiles registered in the petitioner's name.
These automobiles were not located on any of the petitioner's property. The
agents then proceeded to the corporation's office-cottage to seize other
property. A locksmith removed the locks from the garage door and from
the office's rear door. Another luxury car was found in the garage. The
agents were unable to determine whether the cottage was a residence or a
place of business. Norman's son arrived at the scene and notified the agents
that he lived at the cottage. The agents then had the locksmith replace the
locks because according to Internal Revenue Service policy, forced entry
into a residence is not permitted." '
The agents later learned that the cottage was used not as a residence
but as a place of business; therefore, it was immediately placed under sur-
veillance. The agents observed that boxes containing unknown material were
being removed from the cottage and that the car was no longer in the
garage. After two days a decision was made to seize the cottage and its
furnishings and any other assets located therein. On March 23, the agents,
again without a warrant, entered the cottage and removed its contents, in-
cluding business books and records.
In May 1973, the petitioner corporation filed suit against the United
States requesting the return of the automobiles, a claim for suppression of
all evidence obtained from the seized documents, and a claim against the
agents for damages. Its main contentions were that it was not Norman's
alter ego and that the levy upon its premises violated the fourth amendment.
The district court entered judgment for the petitioner ruling that the warrant-
less entry violated the petitioner's rights, that the agents knowingly violated
these rights and that the corporation was not Norman's alter ego. The court
of appeals"so reversed and ruled that the evidence conclusively established that
the petitioner was Norman's alter ego so that its assets could be seized to
satisfy Norman's tax liability.
179 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE MANUAL 5341.
180 514 F.2d 935 (10th Cir. 1975).
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to the fourth amendment
issue and refused to review the lower court's determination that the assess-
ments and levies were valid and that the petitioner was Norman's alter ego.
The Court, relying on Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement
Co.,s' ruled that the seizure of the automobiles on public streets or other
open places did not involve any invasion of privacy. In Murray's Lessee, a
warrantless seizure of a debtor's land was permitted to satisfy a claim of the
United States. Based on this case, the Court rejected the petitioner's claim
that a warrant was required to seize the automobiles registered in the cor-
poration's name. However, the Court maintained that the seizure of books
and records involved an intrusion into the privacy of the petitioner's offices
and it was unpersuaded by any of the government's arguments that the
seizure of the books and records could be made without a warrant.
Specifically, the government argued that there is a broad exception to
the fourth amendment that allows warrantless intrusions into privacy when
in furtherance of the enforcement of tax laws. Also the government contended
that warrantless searches and seizures of the nature involved in this case
were justified by congressional directives under Section 6331. The Court
rejected both of these arguments by contending that one of the evils sought
to be eliminated by the fourth amendment was intrusions into privacy in the
name of tax collection and that Congress, when enacting Section 6331, did
not intend to exempt from the requirements of obtaining a warrant every
invasion of privacy made in furtherance of any tax seizure authorized under
the law.
Also rejected was the government's argument that the peculiar facts
brought the case within the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant
requirement. The Court concluded that the agent's delay after the initial
entry and after observing the removal of boxes from the office supports the
view that no exigent circumstances were present. Chief Justice Burger, in a
concurring opinion, pointed out that "[b]y failing to act at once, the exigency
was dissipated .... ."I" The concurring opinion further indicates that if the
agents had acted immediately in seizing the records and books, a warrant
may not have been required.
The issue of damages for the illegal seizure of the petitioner's books
and records was remanded to the court of appeals for consideration. How-
ever, the Court noted that the ruling in Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Nar-
cotics Agents83 would govern and that the petitioner would not be entitled
to money damages if the revenue agents had acted in good faith. It would
18159 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856).
182 97 S. Ct. at 633.
1s 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
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appear that given the alter ego status of the corporation, and the fact that
all books and records were returned and that the revenue agents attempted to
follow the Internal Revenue Manual, the revenue agents will not be held
liable for damages to the petitioner corporation.
The practical effect of the General Motors Leasing decision appears
to be that the Service is going to have to demonstrate probable cause and
obtain a warrant in order to gain entry into a business premise in order to
seize assets in payment of a tax liability. The Service has already attempted
to circumvent this decision by seeking and obtaining, without a show of
probable cause, so-called writs of entry. Writs of entry permit revenue agents
to enter a business premise to inventory assets rather than remove them.
When taking such an inventory the agents can determine by examining bus-
iness records and books the existence of other assets which could be seized 84
Whether the Supreme Court would require a warrant for such investigations
remains to be seen.
8.03 Flagrant Lack of Cooperation - Fraud
Section 6653 (b) provides for the imposition of a 50 percent penalty
on any deficiency in the payment of income taxes when the underpayment
is due to fraud. Before penalties for fraud may be imposed on the taxpayer,
the Service must prove 85 by clear and convincing evidence that a fraud has
been committed. 8 6 Generally this proof would require a full trial on the
merits. However, in the recent Tax Court case of Thomas J. Hill,8 7 penalties
for fraud were upheld without a trial on the merits largely due to the tax-
payers "flagrant lack of cooperation with the IRS."
Thomas J. Hill, an attorney, and his wife, a teacher, despite the receipt
of income during calendar years 1967, 1968, and 1969, had failed to file
an income tax return as of October 28, 1970 for any of those years. On
October 28, 1970 the Hills were contacted by a revenue agent regarding
their failure to file. They indicated that the returns for 1967, 1968, and 1969
would take at least 60 days to prepare. By the end of 1970, returns for the
three years had still not been filed. The revenue agent again contacted the
Hills and an interview was held on January 26, 1971. During that interview,
Mr. Hill stated that the 1967 return would be filed on February 1, 1971.
The 1967 return was not submitted by February 1, 1971 nor did the Hills
contact the revenue agent to explain the reason for the delay. Subsequent
conversations between the Hills and the revenue agent established April 5,
184 Shapiro, Sup. Ct., in G.M. Leasing, Restricts IRS Property Seizures Without Search War-
rants, 46 THE JOURNAL OF TAxAroN 218 (1977).
185 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 7454(a).
186 Rogers v. Commissioner, 111 F.2d 980 (6th Cir. 1940).
187 P-H TAX CT. MEM. 76,261 (Aug. 28, 1976).
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1971 and then April 8, 1971 as due dates for the 1967 return. On each
occasion the return was not filed and the revenue agent was not contacted.
Finally, on April 15, 1971 the 1967 return was filed.
The Hills were again notified that the 1968 and 1969 returns also had
to be filed. The same pattern emerged as in the filing of the 1967 return
as due dates of June 15, June 20, June 25, July 21, July 26, August 10,
August 24, September 3, September 24, October 7, October 14, October 20,
and December 1 passed without the Hills filing the 1968 and 1969 returns
or contacting the revenue agent.
Finally, on December 2, 1971 the revenue agent served a summons
on the Hills which was returnable on December 14, 1971 and which required
the production of all documents and records necessary to complete the 1968
and 1969 tax returns. The Hills failed to comply with the summons and
again did not contact the agent to explain the reason for their non-compli-
ance. They failed to comply with the summons a second time and on Feb-
mary 12, 1972 a proceeding was brought in a federal district court requesting
enforcement of the summons. On March 30, 1972 the Hills were ordered to
file their 1968 return by April 15, 1972 and their 1969 return by May 15,
1972. The 1968 return was filed on April 15, 1972 but the Hills failed
to comply with the remainder of the order. The Hills finally filed a com-
pleted 1969 return on November 10, 1972, but they were fined for contempt
of court for failure to comply with the court's earlier order.
Subsequent to November 10, 1972, the revenue agent made appoint-
ments to meet Mr. Hill on ten occasions to discuss the audit of his tax returns
for the years 1967 through 1971. Mr. Hill either cancelled or failed to appear
for each of these meetings. The revenue agent made several attempts to meet
with Mr. Hill but was unable to obtain from him the necessary records to
complete the audit.
Since further records were unobtainable, the revenue agent proceeded
to compute the Hills income for 1967, 1968, 1969, 1970, and 1971 by the
bank deposit method. The revenue agent determined that for those five
years the Hills had understated their income in the amount of $549,519.14
and had understated their tax liability in the amount of $267,511.22. A
notice of the deficiency setting forth the Hill's tax liability for 1967 through
1971 was mailed on April 12, 1974. Pursuant to Section 6653 (b), a 50
percent penalty for fraud in the amount of $134,332.44 was added to the
deficiency.
Mr. and Mrs. Hill timely filed a petition in the Tax Court on July 15,
1974, contesting the validity of the deficiencies and the imposition of penal-
ties for fraud. The Service filed an answer to the petition on September 12,
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1974 setting forth affirmative allegations in support of the imposition of
the deficiencies and penalties. The Hills failed to reply and the Service then
moved for an order that the undenied allegations in the answer be deemed
admitted. After the Hills failed to respond to a request for admissions, the
Service moved for summary judgment which motion was similarly ignored
by the Hills.
The motion for summary judgment was subsequently granted and the
additions to the tax, i.e., the penalties for fraud were upheld by the Tax
Court. The court pointed out that the burden of proving fraud was upon
the Service and that such burden is usually met at trial. However, the court
also noted that given the facts of this case, fraudulent intent on the part of
the taxpayer could be found despite the lack of a full trial. In addition, pro-
cedural factors such as the petitioner's failure to respond to the affirmative
allegations of fraud in the Service's answer or to its motion that the undenied
allegations be deemed admitted supported the allegations of fraud; in fact
the court deemed the allegations to be admitted by the Hills. The main reasons
for an affirmative finding of fraud were based however, on three other fac-
tors: (1) the extremely large discrepencies between the taxpayer's actual
income and reported income, (2) the taxpayer's total lack of cooperation in
the audit and (3) the fact that both Mr. and Mrs. Hill were educated pro-
fessionals who were well informed of the law.
8.04 Section 7602 Discovery
A recent Tenth Circuit decision, United States v. Coopers Lybrand,18"
held that the Internal Revenue Service does not have unrestricted discovery
power and that audit programs prepared by the respondent Coopers Lybrand
for internal use in auditing John-Manville, Inc. were not discoverable pur-
suant to Section 7602. The court also maintained that a tax pool analysis
prepared by the corporate taxpayer, John-Manville, Inc. and used by Coopers
Lybrand in verifying John-Manville's financial statements was not discover-
able despite claims that the documents might indicate inconsistent positions
and improper figures and, thereby, assist the Service in determining whether
to examine particular areas.
In 1974, the Service issued a summons under its Section 7602 discovery
powers directing Coopers Lybrand to produce its books and records relative
to its audit of John-Manville, Inc. Since the Service has audited every federal
income tax return of John-Manville, Coopers Lybrand responded to the
summons and produced many work papers and documents but did not dis-
close the audit program or the tax pool analysis file. The audit program was
specially developed by Coopers Lybrand to audit John-Manville and mainly
188550 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1977).
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included a list of procedures to be followed during the audit process. The
tax pool analysis contained estimates of John-Manville's future income tax lia-
bilities and was utilized in preparing financial statements in compliance with
SEC requirements. Neither the audit program nor the tax analysis pool were
used in preparing John-Manville's tax returns.
After Coopers Lybrand refused to produce the audit program and tax
pool analysis file, the Service sought judicial enforcement of the summons
pursuant to Sections 7402 (b) and 7604 (a). After a full evidentiary hearing,
the district court denied enforcement of the summons, largely basing its
decision on the fact that neither the audit program nor the tax analysis pool
was prepared in connection with the preparation or filing of John-Manville's
tax returns. The Service promptly appealed.
The court of appeals affirmed the lower court's decision concluding that
the Service does not "have carte blanche discovery."'" 9 The court of appeals
relied on the standard developed by the Supreme Court in United States v.
Powell.' In Powell, the Court maintained that given the Service's broad
investigative powers under Section 7602, it need not show probable cause
prior to an issuance of a summons. The Service must show, however, "that the
investigation will be conducted pursuant to a legitimate purpose, that the
inquiry may be relevant to the purpose, that the information sought is not
already within the Commissioner's possession, and that the administrative
steps required by the Code have been followed .... ,192
The court of appeals, emphasizing the fact that neither document was
used in preparing John-Manville's tax returns, concluded that the Powell
standard in assessing the validity of a summons was not met in the present
case. The court would allow discovery of documents that directly dealt with
the taxpayer's return or were a source of information for the return, but it
refused to extend the Service's discovery powers to those documents that
were not used in any way with the preparation or filing of the taxpayer's
return.
8.05 Compliance With Summons - Third Party Reimbursement
Section 7610, added by the 1976 Tax Reform Act, allows any third
party served with a summons pursuant to Sections 6420 (e) (2), 6421 (f)
(2), 6424 (d) (2), 6427 (e) (2) or 7602 for the production of records or
other information to be compensated for the costs of complying with the
summons."9 2 Section 7610 (a) provides for the compensation of personnel
189 ld. at 619.
'90 376 U.S. 48 (1964).
191 Id. at 57.
192 5 P-H 1977 FED. TAXES 39,665.5.
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search time, computer costs, reproduction costs and transportation costs.
In addition, persons summoned to appear before the Service as a witness
can recover fees and mileage.
On January 14, 1977 procedures were announced by Commissioner
Alexander concerning the payment to third parties of costs incurred in com-
plying with an Internal Revenue Service summons.19 Search time expended
for the retrieval of documents or other information requested specifically
by the summons is compensated at the rate of $5 per hour. Reproduction
costs are payable at the rate of ten cents per page. Compensation for trans-
portation expenses under Section 7610 (a) (2) are limited to actual costs
incurred in transporting persons to locate and retrieve summoned documents
and to transport these documents to the place of examination. Under the
provisions of the regulations, the Service is also required to pay per diem
and mileage costs when a witness is required to appear by a summons.
Any third party served with a summons requiring his production of
records and documents can recover the costs of complying. Section 7610 (b)
specifically excludes from those entitled to compensation the taxpayer or an
officer, employee, agent, accountant or attorney of the taxpayer. Therefore,
third parties such as banks and brokerage houses will be the primary bene-
ficiaries of the new law.
Those third parties served with a summons must maintain accurate and
detailed records of search time, transportation costs, computer costs and re-
production costs in order to take advantage of these new procedures. Itemized
bills may be submitted directly to the agent who issued the summons or may
be mailed to the appropriate Internal Revenue Service office after compliance
with the particular summons. The regulations further require Service employ-
ees who issue a third party summons to provide a notice to that party outlining
reimbursement procedures. 9'
9.00 Inventory
10.00 Pension, Profit-Sharing and Stock Ownership Plans
10.01 Overpayments to Individual Retirement Accounts
A taxpayer who is not covered by an employer plan or other qualified
retirement plan is allowed a deduction for contributions to his individual
retirement account.195 Each year the taxpayer may contribute 15 percent of
193 6 P-H 1977 FED. TAxEs 55,182.
194 Id.
195 Ir. REV. CODE of 1954, § 219. See also Briner, Federal ncome Tax Developments:
1974, 8 AKRON L. REV. 206, 291-93 (1975).
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his compensation or $1,500, whichever is less." 6 By utilizing such a plan, the
contributions and income made under the plan are not taxed until funds
are distributed out of the plan.' However, if the taxpayer contributes more
than the maximum amount to his retirement account he faces a double
taxation. The excess contribution is initially taxed as income, since that
amount would not qualify as a deduction." 8 The excess would also be subject
to a 6 percent cumulative excise tax. 9' Furthermore, that 6 percent penalty
would not be deductible from the taxpayer's gross income.20°
Under Section 4973 (b)..' there are two situations where the excess
contributions would avoid the 6 percent excise tax: (1) when the taxpayer
has contributed to an individual retirement account and later that year his
employer starts a retirement plan for the taxpayer, and (2) when the tax-
payer has contributed in excess of his salary proportion. °2 For example, in
the first situation, a taxpayer who had contributed $1,500 to his retirement
account and later that year became an active participant in a qualified em-
ployer plan would have incurred $1,500 plus interest thereon as income and
a 6 percent penalty tax. Also, he would have had a ten percent penalty for a
premature withdrawal if he had removed his $1,500 contribution before
he was 59 years of age. But, under Section 4793 (b) (2) that taxpayer
may withdraw the $1,500 plus interest any time prior to the due date for
that year's tax return and thus, avoid all penalties; however, the $1,500 plus
interest would have to be reported as income at that time.
The taxpayer who had contributed $1,500 to his individual retirement
account and later discovered that 15 percent of that year's salary was only
$1,000, could also avoid the penalty taxes. If he withdrew the excess plus
its proportion of interest within the filing deadline for that year's tax return,
there would be no penalty. However, as in the first situation, the taxpayer
would have to include the withdrawal and its proportion of interest as income.
10.02 Lump Sum Distributions
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 virtually forces all coordinators of quali-
fied benefit plans to review their distribution procedures. For employees who
196INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 219(b)(1). For the married taxpayer, when the spouse is
unemployed, the maximum amount is increased to the lesser of 15 percent of compensation
or $1,750. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 220(b)(1).
19 7 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 408(d)(1).
198 lINT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 219(b)(1).
19 INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 4973(a).
200 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 275(a)(6).
201 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 4973(b). Section 4973(b) became effective January 1, 1977;
however, the same rule applies to taxpayers in earlier years. 6 P-H 1977 FED. TAXES
55,221.
202 INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 4973(b).
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die after December 21, 1976, lump sum distributions from qualified corporate
plans are no longer excluded from the decedent's estate."'3 To avoid inclusion
in the estate as a "lump sum distribution," payments must occur in at least
two taxable years. " Similarly, Keogh plans providing for a lump sum
distribution will be included in the estate.0" For distributions other than lump
sum distributions, the proceeds are excluded from the estate only to the
extent the plan contributions qualified for an income tax deduction?'" In
selecting an annuity or lump sum payout, the estate costs should be compared
with the possible income tax savings provided by income-averaging the lump
sum distribution.
Lump sum distributions from qualified individual retirement accounts,""
individual retirement annuities, 20 and retirement bonds, 9 continue to be
includible in a decedent's gross estate. However, the Tax Reform Act pro-
vided an estate tax exclusion for annuity payments from these plans. To be
excludible, the annuity must be payable in "substantially equal periodic
payments" over at least a thirty-six month period.21
In reviewing these qualified plans, the plan participant is probably the
best person to select the type of payment. Leaving this decision to the bene-
ficiary might result in a conflict between his interests and those of other
interested parties. In addition, the Commissioner might contend that the
beneficiary was in "constructive receipt" of the proceeds by virtue of having
the power to designate a mode of payment. On the other hand, placing this
decision in the hands of the plan administrators would create a situation
where any antagonized party might seek recompense from the administrators.
By comparison, the plan administrators could avoid this situation by leaving
the decision to the plan participant and providing an annual explanation of
the different settlement options. Finally, the Tax Reform Act amended the
gift tax law to permit the plan participant to elect a mode of payment without
any resulting gift tax liability. 1'
2 0 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2039(c), as amended by Pub. Law No. 94-455, § 2009(c)(3),
90 Stat. 1862 (1976).
2 04 INT.. REv. CODE of 1954, § 402(e)(4) (A).
205 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2039(c).
206 Id.
2 0 7 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 408(a).
208 Id. § 408(b).
2 09 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 409(a).
210 INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 2039(e), added by Pub. Law No. 94-455, § 2009(c)(1), 90
Stat. 1894 (1976).
211 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2517, as amended by Pub. Law No. 94-455, § 2009(c)(4)(A),
90 Stat. 1895 (1976).
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10.03 Coverage Requirements of Qualified Plans
In Edward L. Burnetta, O.D., P.A.,212 an optometrist and an opthal-
mologist attempted to limit the expenses of their professional corporations'
pension and profit-sharing plans by "renting" their employees from a service
corporation owned by a third party. In actuality, the service corporation pro-
vided nothing more than a payroll service; hiring, firing, wage-setting, and
supervision were entirely within the purview of the doctors. The Tax Court
ruled that the employee of the service corporation was actually a full-time
employee of the Burnetta Corporation. Consequently, the corporate pension
and profit-sharing plans covering the two professionals failed to satisfy the
minimum coverage requirements of Section 401.
Petitioners relied on Ronald C. Packard.1 where three dentist-partners
successfully established a service corporation to supply themselves and three
other dentists with facilities and services. The Tax Court upheld a profit-
sharing plan covering only the partners because the service corporation pro-
vided a complete personnel function. Revenue Ruling 75-4111 was also
distinguished from the Burnetta fact situation because Burnetta could not
show that the service corporation controlled its own employees. To treat
workers as employees of a service corporation, the service corporation must
provide more than a payroll function, even if such services are provided to
more than one employee.
10.04 Owner-Employee: Ten Percent Limit
Section 401 (c) (3) (B) 21 defines an "owner-employee" of a partner-
ship Keogh plan as a partner who owns more than a ten percent interest in
either the capital or profit of the partnership. Generally, large partnerships
are able to avoid the unfavorable restrictions which result from such a classi-
fication.21 However, a recent Tax Court case211 suggests that even large
partnerships should review their partnership agreements to avoid the possi-
bility of inadvertently disqualifying their Keogh plan. 21
8
212 68 T.C. No. 33 (June 13, 1977).
21363 T.C. 621 (1975). See Briner, Federal Income Tax Developments: 1975, 9 AKRON
L. REV. 411, 501 (1976).
214 Rev. Rul. 75-41, 1975-1 CUM. BULL. 323.
215 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 401(c)(3)(B).
- For example, once a partner is determined to be an "owner-employee," the plan must
make the trustee a bank or similarly qualified person (Id. § 401(d)(1)), no distributions
may be made before age 59 nor later than age 701 (Id. § 401(a)(9)(A)), all full-time
employees with at least 3 years of service must be covered (Id. § 401(d)(3)(A)), and
annual contributions are subject to special limitations (Id. § 401(d)(5), § 404(e)).
217 Hill, Farrer and Burrill, 67 T.C. No. 33 (1976). It should be noted that an appeal of
this decision has been made to the Ninth Circuit.
218 For information on plans for the self-employed, see Briner, Federal Income Tax
Developments: 1974, 8 AKRON L. REv. 206, 288 (1975).
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That case involved a large law firm with nineteen full partners. While
each partner had less than a ten percent capital interest in the firm, the
profit-sharing formula made it possible for any one partner to receive more
than ten percent of the total firm profits. Even though no partner had a
contractual right in advance to more than ten percent of the net profits, the
Tax Court interpreted "owns" in Section 401 (c) (3) (B) as a term "broad
enough to include a partner's contractual right to percentage interests mea-
sured by earnings productivity during the taxable year." 1' An obvious, but
probably undesirable solution to such a problem could be effectuated by
inserting a provision in the partnership agreement restricting any one partner's
interest in profits to ten percent of the annual net profits.
11.00 Corporations
11.01 Controlled Group - Common Ownership Not Required
Section 1561 was adopted as a result of continued congressional con-
cern over the use of multiple corporations by large enterprises to gain certain
tax benefits designed for use by small businesses only. This Code section
limits the member corporations of a controlled group to only one surtax
exemption, i.e., one $150,000 amount for purposes of computing the ac-
cumlated earnings credit and one $25,000 amount available as a small
business deduction to insurance companies.
Section 1563 classifies a brother-sister corporation as a controlled group
if five or fewer persons own at least 80 percent of the combined voting
power or value of the stock of each corporation and more than 50 percent
of the stock of each corporation individually. In Fairfax Auto Parts of North-
ern Virginia, Inc. v. Commissioner,22 the Tax Court held that a brother-
sister corporation did not exist where the two shareholders did not own stock
in both corporations. The court stated that only the shareholder owning
stock in both corporations could be counted for the 80 percent test.
The Fourth Circuit has reversed this decision22' and upheld Treasury
Regulation § 1.1563-1 (2) (3) by holding that shareholders need not own
stock in all member corporations to be counted for the 80 percent test of
brother-sister status. Hence the Fourth Circuit has limited brother-sister cor-
porations to one surtax exemption to be allocated among themselves. This
conclusion parallels the language of Section 1561 that limits member cor-
porations to only one surtax exemption.
219 67 T.C. 233 (1976).
220 65 T.C. 798 (1976).
221 Fairfax Auto Parts of N. Va., Inc. v. Commissioner, 548 F.2d 501 (4th Cir. 1977), rev'g
65 T.C. 798 (1976).
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11.02 Section 368 Reorganization - Carryback of Losses
Section 381 (b) (3) allows an acquiring corporation, after a type F
reorganization, to carryback net operating losses for taxable years ending
after the reorganization to taxable years prior to the reorganization. Section
368 (a) (1) (F) defines a type F reorganization as a mere change in identity,
form, or place or organization. In Revenue Ruling 75-561,22 the Service
maintains that two or more corporations may qualify as a type F reorganiza-
tion if three specified conditions have been met. One condition is that there
must be complete identity of shareholders and of their proprietary interests
in the transferor corporations and acquiring corporations."'
A recent case, Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,2 ' involved a complex
triangular reorganization whereby Aetna Life, owners of 61.6 percent of the
stock of Old Aetna, organized a shell corporation, Farmington Valley. Farm-
ington Valley acquired all the stock of Old Aetna and then cancelled the
acquired shares while Aetna Life retired a portion of their shares. By opera-
tion of Connecticut's merger law, Farmington succeeded to all the assets
and liabilities of Old Aetna. Farmington then changed its name to New Aetna
and continued Old Aetna's business. In 1964 and 1965, New Aetna incurred
net operating losses and tried to carryback the losses to prior taxable years.
The Commissioner disallowed such carryback, claiming that they are only
allowed in the instance where a type F reorganization has been effected.
The court disagreed with the Service and held that there had been a type F
reorganization, since there was merely a shift in the proprietary interest of the
minority shareholders of Old Aetna. 5 The court also indicated that if the
change in proprietary interests were to new persons and less than 50 percent
of the former stockholder's interest in the old corporation remained in the
new corporation, then the reorganization might not qualify as a type F reor-
ganization within the meaning of Section 368 (a) (1) (F)."2
11.03 Section 368 Reorganization - Carryforward of Losses
Sections 381 and 382 were added to the Code in 1954 in an effort to
"protect taxpayers against the loss of favorable tax attributes, as well as to
prevent the avoidance of unfavorable ones by paper reorganizations." 2 7 In
222 Rev. Rul. 75-561, 1975-2 CuM. BULL. 129.
223 Id. The other two required conditions are (1) the transfer corporation and the acquiring
corporation must be engaged in the same business activities before the combination; and (2)
the business enterprise of the transferor corporation and the acquiring corporation must
continue unchanged after the combination.




227r Rn AND EUSTiCE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS,
16-14 (3d ed. 1971).
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general, Section 381 allows an acquiring corporation, after a Section 368
reorganization has been effected, to carryforward the net operating losses
of the acquired corporation. Where there is less than a 20 percent continuity
of ownership in the resulting corporation, Section 382 (b) proportionally
reduces the amount of the net operating loss carryover which is available to
the transferor corporation."' But, if the transferor corporation and the ac-
quiring corporation are owned substantially by the same persons in the same
proportion, the above-mentioned limitation does not apply. 9
The Tax Court in Kern's Bakery of Virginia, Inc. 2 has ruled that in
a three corporation reorganization where the shareholders of a loss corpora-
tion only acquire a ten percent interest in the acquiring corporation and the
three corporations were not owned "substantially by the same persons in the
same proportions," the amount of the deductible net operating loss carry-
over is reduced by 50 percent. Here, the members of two unrelated families
each owned 50 percent of three corporations which, pursuant to Section
368 (a) (1) (A), effected a reorganization. Prior to the reorganization,
one of the corporations had an unused net operating carryover loss of
$558,026.58. Subsequent to the reorganization, the two families each owned
50 percent of the acquiring corporation, but each family member's interest
varied from their respective interests before the reorganization. In addition,
the loss corporation only owned ten percent of the stock of the acquiring
corporation.
In Commonwealth Container Corp.,2"' the members of a family owned
100 percent of the stock of Tri-City, a loss corporation, and the same family
owned 75 percent of the stock of Commonwealth, a profitable corporation.
The two companies merged and the stockholders of Tri-City received only
13 percent of the stock of the surviving entity. The Tax Court held that the
Tri-City carryover had to be scaled down 35 percent. In deciding whether
Section 382 (b) (3) applied, the Tax Court established its own test al-
though the regulations set out, in examples, a test which tolerates only a de
minimis percentage difference in stockholdings."' In holding that Section
382 (b) (3) did not apply, the Tax Court stated:
228 Where the resulting interest of the acquired corporation is less than 20 percent, Section
382(b)(2) requires a five percent reduction in the net operating loss carryover for each
percentage point that the acquired corporation's interest is below 20 percent. For changes in
Section 382(b)(2) due to the Tax Reform Act, see Briner, Federal Income Tax Develop-
ments: 1976, 10 AKRON L. REV. 393, 515 (1976).
229 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 382(b) (3).
230 68 T.C. No. 44 (1977).
231 48 T.C. No. 47 (1967).
232 Treas. Reg. § 1.382(b)-1(d) sets out four examples where Section 382(b)(3) will be
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We surmise that [Section 382 (b) (3)] was inserted to avoid application
of the mechanical test provided in paragraph (2) where both corpora-
tions involved in a reorganization were for all practical purposes owned
by the same persons in the same proportions before the reorganization
so that it would make little difference how much stock of the acquiring
corporation was issued to the transferor corporation or its stockholders
under the plan of reorganization, because the same persons who suffered
the losses would be getting the benefit of the carryover in the same pro-
portions as the losses were incurred.3 s
In Kern's Bakery of Virginia, Inc., petitioners argued that the attribu-
tion rules of Section 318 apply as they are helpful in determining who
"substantially the same persons" are. In rejecting petitioner's contention, the
court noted that Section 318 is not applicable directly or indirectly unless
expressly made so.2" ' In addition, the court noted that the word "substan-
tially" modifies the word "owned" and not the term "persons."2 35 Petitioners
finally maintained that their substantial continuing interest entitles them to
a full carryover as the rule of Section 382 (b) is inequitable. The Tax Court
responded that "if the rule is to be changed it is the province of the Congress
rather than the Courts to change it."'213
11.04 Professional Corporations
In Revenue Ruling 70-101, 2"t the Service took the position that pro-
fessional corporations formed and operated under state statutes238 would
233 Commonwealth Container Corp., 48 T.C. No. 47 at 493-94 (1967).
234 Kern's Bakery of Virginia, Inc., 68 T.C. No. 44 at 292 (1977); World Service Life Ins.
Co. v. United States, 471 F.2d 251 (1973).
2-5 Kern's Bakery of Virginia, Inc., 68 T.C. No. 44 at 293 (1977).
236 Id.
227 Rev. Rul. 70-101, 1970-1 CuM. BULL. 278.
238 In a majority of states, statutes have been enacted for the incorporation of all professionals:
ALA. CODE tit. 10, §9 10-4-220 to 10-4-239 (1977); ALASKA STAT. §§ 10.45.010 to 10.45.200
(1968); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-901 to 10-909 (Supp. 1977); ARK. STAT. ANN. 99
64-2001 to 64-2017 (Cum. Supp. 1975); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. H§ 33-182(a) to 33-182(j)
(Cum. Supp. 1977); DEL. CODE tit. 8, 9H 601-19 (1975); D.C. CODE ENCYCL. 99 29-1107
to 29-1121 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); FLA. STAT. § 621.01 to 621.15 (1977); GA.
CODE ANN. 99 84-4301 to 84-4813 (1975); HAWAn REV. STAT. 99 416-141 to 416-154
(Supp. 1975); IDAHO CODE 99 30-1301 to 30-1315 (1967 & Cum. Supp. 1977); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 32, §§ 415-1 to 415-17 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1977); IND. CODE ANN. §§
23-1-13-1 to 23-1-13-11 (Burns 1972); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 274.004 to 274.990 (Baldwin
1969); ME. REy. STAT. tit. 13, §§ 701 to 716 (1974); MD. CORP. & Ass'Ns CODE ANN.
H§ 5-101 to 5-122 (1975); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 99 450.221 to 450.235 (1967); Miss.
CODE ANN. 99 79-9-1 to 79-9-27 (1973); NEB. REV. STAT. H9 21-2201 to 21-2222 (1974);
NEV. REV. STAT. §9 89.010 to 89.110 (1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 14A:17-1 to 14A:17-18
(West Cum. Supp. 1977); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 51-22-1 to 51-22-14 (Supp. 1975); N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAW §§ 1501 to 1516 (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1976-1977); N.D. CENT. CODE §§
10-31-01 to 10-31-14 (1976); OR. REV. STAT. 99 58.005 to 58.365 (1975); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15, §§ 2901 to 2914 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); S.C. CODE H9 33-51-10
to 33-51-170 (1977); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-2001 to 48-2007 (Cum. Supp. 1976); TEx.
REV. Civ. STAT. art. 1528 f. (Cum. Supp. 1976-1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 801-13
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generally be treated as corporations. As a result, accountants, attorneys, chiro-
practors, doctors, dentists, and many other professionals have formed pro-
fessional corporations. By incorporating and becoming employees of their
own corporations, professionals have been able to gain numerous fringe bene-
fits that are deductible to the corporation and non-income to the individual.""
Incorporated professionals have also been able to provide themselves with
greater pension and profit-sharing plans."*
Since the Service conceded that professional corporations organized
under state law would "generally" ' 1 be treated as corporations, what criteria
will it use to differentiate a professional corporation from a partnership and
other non-incorporated entities? The Section 7701... definition of a corpora-
tion is too broad to be of assistance. However, the Treasury Regulations43
contain a detailed classification of criteria that distinguish a corporation from
a partnership or a trust. But, the application of these criteria to a profes-
sional corporation generally results in its classification as a partnership.""4
In Revenue Ruling 77-31,1" the Service stated that state law would
control in deciding if an organization was a professional corporation. The
(1973); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 18.100.010 to 18.100.140 (Supp. 1976); Wisc. STAT. ANN.
§§ 180.99(1) to 180.99(11) (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); WYo. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-49.1
to 17-49.2 (Cum. Supp. 1975). The following states have enacted statutes for the incorpo-
ration of particular professionals: CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 13400 to 13410 (West 1977);
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 12-2-101 to 12-2-131, 12-33-124, 12-40-125, 12-36-134, 12-41-125,
12-43-118 (1974); COLO. R. CIv. P. 265 (1974); IowA CODE ANN. §§ 496C.1 to 496C.22
(West. Cur. Supp. 1977); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-2700 to 17-2719 (1974); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 12:801 to 12-815, 12:901 to 12:915 (West 1969); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
156 A, §§ 1 to 17 (West Cum. Supp. 1977); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 319A.01 to 319A.22
(West Cum. Supp. 1977); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 15-2101 to 15-2116 (1967);
N.H. REV. STAT. §§ 294-A:1 to 294-A:8 (Supp. 1975); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55B-1 to
55B-15 (1975); Omo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1785.01 to 1785.08 (Page 1964 & Supp. 1976);
R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 7-5.1-1 to 7-5.1-8 (Supp. 1976); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 47-11-1
to 47-11-21, 47-12-1 to 47-12-21, 47-13-1 to 47-13-21, 47-11A-1 to 47-11A-20,
47-I1B-1 to 47-11B-23, 47-13A-1 to 47-13A-10, 47-13B-1 to 47-13B-18 (1969 & Supp.
1977); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 16-11-1 to 16-11-15 (1973); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54-873
to 54-898 (1974); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 30-3-4(b) to 30-3-4(c), 30-4-4(b) to 30-4-4(c),
30-2-5 to 30-2-5(a) (1976).
In all of the state statutes, there are various qualifications to be met in creating a
professional corporation. For example, Hawaii requires that a professional corporation
contain three or more members and Vermont requires two or more members. The other
states allow one or more members to form a professional corporation.
239 E.g., TNT. REV. CODE Of 1954, §§ 79, 104, 105, 106.
240 See TNT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 404.
241 Rev. Rul. 70-101, 1970-1 CuM. BULL. 278.
242 TNT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 7701. "The term 'corporation' includes associations, joint-
stock companies, and insurance companies." Id. at § 7701(a) (3).
243 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2.
244 See id. See also 301.7701-2(g) (examples of the application of the classification
criteria).
245 Rev. Rul. 77-31, TNT. REV. BULL, No. 5 at 18.
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taxpayer therein was the sole shareholder, principal officer, and operator of
a professional corporation and requested advice as to the criteria for determin-
ing his corporate tax status. The Service conceded that if the organization
satisfied state statutory requirements for the formation and operation of a
professional corporation, then those detailed regulations under Section 7701
need not be applied to determine its tax classification.
It would now appear that professionals can rely on a single standard
of corporate treatment for most, if not all, purposes. However, it should be
noted that the professional must do more than form a corporation in name
alone; he must also operate under the state statutes as a corporation.46
11.05 Incorporation of a Cash-Basis Taxpayer: Section 357 Liabilities
In Donald D. Focht, "4 the Tax Court reversed its interpretation of the
meaning of liabilities within Section 357 (c). Here, as in previous cases, the
taxpayer used the cash-basis method of reporting income and transferred all
the assets and liabilities from his sole proprietorship to a newly formed cor-
poration in exchange for all its stock. The liabilities primarily consisted of
accounts payable which greatly exceeded the basis of the transferred assets.
The Tax Court, in deciding that no gain need be recognized, held:
It is inappropriate to treat an assumed liability of a cash method tax-
payer as income to him and simultaneously to deny him a tax benefit,
if the obligation would have been deductible upon his payment, for the
satisfaction of the debt. Congressional intent under Sections 357 and
358 (d), was to affect only those liabilities that, if assumed by a trans-
feree corporation in a tax-free exchange, would cause gain recognition.
An obligation should not be treated as a liability, under Sections 357
and 358, to the extent that its payment would have been deductible if
made by the transferor. '
Previously, there had been confusion among the Tax Court and the
Second, Seventh and Ninth Circuits. The Tax Court, following their decision
in Peter Raich,4 9 had maintained that the full amount of accounts payable
of a cash-basis taxpayer are liabilities within Section 357 (c). In Testor v.
Commissioner,"'0 the Seventh Circuit stated that Section 357 (c) applies
wherever liabilities are assumed or property is transferred subject to liability.
Taking the other position, the Second Circuit in Bongiovanni v. Commis-
246See Jerome J. Roubik, 53 T.C. 365 (1969) (Tannerwald, J., concurring).
24? 68 T.C. No. 21 (1977).
2" Id. at 130.
249 46 T.C. 604 (1966). See generally Briner, Federal Income Tax Developments: 1973,
7 AKRaON L. REv. 188, 252-56 (1973).
220327 F.2d 788 (7th Cir. 1964).
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sioner 5' reversed the Tax Court by stating that accounts payable are not tax
liabilities although they are accounting liabilities. And the Ninth Circuit in
Thatcher v. Commissioner52 has applied the set-off theory by reducing the
amount of accounts payable against accounts receivable, up to the lesser of
the accounts payable or the gain recognized under Section 357 (c).
Although the Tax Court now holds that no gain will be recognized
upon the transfer of a deductible obligation by a cash-basis taxpayer where
the obligation is non-deductible, or in the case of an accrual-basis taxpayer
where payment by the transferor would not entitle him to an additional tax
benefit, gain will be recognized.2 53
In deciding the Focht case, the Tax Court stated that it has always
realized that its rule gave "a harsh result that does not appear to be in con-
formity with the overall purposes of the tax-free incorporation and assumption
of liability provisions."2"4 It was further noted that since the Second and
Ninth Circuits have shown the way, the Tax Court will soften its rule.
11.06 Waiver of Family Attribution Rules
The Service, in Revenue Ruling 77-293, 25' has modified Revenue Ruling
57-38750 concerning the reduction of the capital gains tax in determining
whether tax avoidance was a principal purpose of a transfer to a family
member within ten years of a redemption. Section 302 (c) (2) (A) provides
that if all the stock actually owned by a shareholder is redeemed by the cor-
poration, the family attribution rules of Section 318 will be waived if certain
conditions are met. Where some of the conditions have not been met, the
family attribution rules may still be waived if it can be shown that the avoid-
ance of federal income tax was not a principal purpose in the failure to meet
the specified conditions." 7 The regulations state that a transfer shall not be
deemed to have the avoidance of federal income tax as one of its principal
purposes merely because the transferee is in a lower income tax bracket
than the transferor.5
Since the promulgation of Revenue Ruling 56-556,59 the Service has
tried to set guidelines as to the meaning of "tax avoidance" within Section
302 (c) (2) (B). In that ruling, a husband and wife owned 255 shares of
251 470 F.2d 921, 923 (2d Cir. 1972).
252 37 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 76-1068 (9th Cir. 1976).
23 68 T.C. No. 21 at 135 (1977).
254 Id. at 129.
255 Rev. Rul. 77-293, INT. REv. BULL. No. 34 at 9.
256 Rev. Rul. 57-387, 1957-2 CuM. BULL. 225.
25 7 
IN r. REv. CODE of 1954, § 302(c)(2)(B).
25 8 Treas. Reg. § 1.302-4(g).
259 Rev. Rul. 56-556, 1956-2 CUM. BULL. 177.
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a corporation created to exercise an automobile franchise, with their son
owning the remaining 80 shares. The son had received the shares as a gift
from his father in 1947 and at such time his father did not intend to retire.
In 1955, the father decided to retire and the manufacturer-grantor approved
a sale to the son. The Internal Revenue Service indicated that the 1947 gift
was not tax motivated and, accordingly, waived the family attribution rules
in permitting a complete termination of the parents' interest in the corpora-
tion.
Again, in Revenue Ruling 56-584,16 a father who was president and
the major shareholder of a corporation made a gift of a seven percent stock
interest in the corporation to his son who was employed by the corporation.
Five years later, the son's shares were redeemed at his request. The Service
ruled that the gift was not tax motivated. It indicated that since no stock
redemption was planned at the time the gift was made, and that, as the gift
was designed to encourage the son's interest in the corporation, tax avoidance
was not one of the primary purposes of the gift.
In Revenue Ruling 57-387, the Service ruled that neither the acquisition
of stock in a corporation by the three sons from their parents nor the dis-
position of part of their stock to their father had as one of its principal
purposes the avoidance of federal income taxes. But within the ruling, the
Service implied that if such a previous transfer actually resulted in a tax
saving, that might in itself show that tax avoidance was one of the principal
purposes.
Now, in Revenue Ruling 77-293, the Internal Revenue Service has
clarified its position and ruled that where a son is trained to take over his
father's business, a gift of stock of the corporation from the father to the
son which was not made in contemplation of a redemption, is not a transfer
made with one of its primary purposes being the avoidance of the federal
income tax. In the ruling, the Service indicated that:
the purpose of Section 302 (c) (2) (B) is not to prevent reduction
of capital gains through gifts of appreciated stock prior to the redemption
of the remaining stock of the transferor, but to prevent the withdrawal
of earnings at capital gains rates by a shareholder of a family controlled
corporation who seeks continued control and/or economic interest in
the corporation through the stock given to a related person or the stock
he retains.2"'
In addition, the Service indicated that only an analysis of all the facts and
circumstances of a particular situation will be determinative of whether a
280 Rev. Rul. 56-584, 1956-2 CuM. BuLL. 179.
281 Rev. Rul. 77-293, INT. REV. BULL. No. 34 at 10.
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transfer had as one of its principal purposes the avoidance of the federal
income tax.262
11.07 Transactions with Related Taxpayers - 2Y2 Month Rule
A transaction without substance will not be realized for tax purposes.2 6
However, even if a transaction had substance, if it occurred between related
taxpayers, the tax consequences may be harmful. For example, a deduction
will be denied to an accrual-basis corporation if payment is not made within
two and one-half months of the close of its tax year to a cash-basis taxpayer
who owned more than 50 percent of the corporation..2 " Further, the deduction
is lost forever, even if the corporation makes subsequent payment.2 ' 5 And,
when a payment is made, the individual will have to include it as income.
Even if the individual taxpayer did not actually own over 50 percent
of the corporation, his constructive ownership of stock held by applicable
family members, partners, trusts, estates, and other companies could result
in the application of the nondeductibility provision. 6 For example, the indi-
vidual who actually owned 48 percent of a corporation would be considered
the constructive owner of the two percent owned by his wife and of the one
percent owned by his brother. Thus, if his salary had not been paid in two
years by the corporation, the deduction would be lost to the accrual-basis
corporation for any subsequent payment of that salary since the individual
owned 51 percent of the corporation. However, as long as the corporation
acts within two and one-half months of the close of its tax year, the deduction
will be allowed if cash and stock26' or promissory notes268 are transferred to
the related taxpayer. The corporation may also avoid the nondeductibility
provision if the running account of the related taxpayer is credited. 9
11.08 Life Insurance Proceeds - Valuation of Corporate Stock
Life insurance proceeds payable to a corporation must be considered
with all other non-operating assets to determine the value of close corpora-
tion stock.270 In Estate of John L. Huntsman,2"" the Commissioner contended
262 Id.
263 See Knetoch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361, 366 (1960). See also Gregory v. Helvering,
293 U.S. 464, 469 (1935).
2 64 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 267(a)(2).
265 See Treas. Reg. § 1.267(a)-l(b); Liflans Corporation v. United States, 390 F.2d 965,
974 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
266 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 267(c); Treas. Reg. § 1.267(c)-i..
267 See H.C. Stillman Shoe Co., 14 P-H TAX Cr. MEM. 45,275, at 45-929 (1945).
2 68 See Rev. Rul. 55-608, 1955-2 CuM. BULL. 546.
269 See Barnebey-Chemey Engineering Co., 23 P-H TAx CT. MEM. 54,210, at 54-659
(1954).
270Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(f).
271 66 T.C. No. 81 (Sept. 11, 1976).
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that the value of a sole shareholder's stock must be directly increased by the
amount of key man life insurance proceeds received by the corporation. The
Tax Court refused to approve the Commissioner's contention; however, in
considering all relevant factors-including earnings, net asset values, insur-
ance proceeds and the effect of the president's death-the court found the
stock value to be higher than the value claimed by the estate. Consequently,
the corporation had to pay more for the stock it redeemed under Section
303. In Huntsman, no valid arm's length stock redemption agreement existed
between the shareholder and his various corporations at the time of his
death. Perhaps such an agreement might have avoided this valuation problem.
The Commissioner has now acquiesced in the decision reached by the
Tax Court."' However, a major issue remains to be contested: should the
proceeds of corporate-owned life insurance used to fund a Section 303 stock
redemption be attributed to the estate of a controlling shareholder? Section
20.2042-1 (C) (6) provides that corporate-owned life insurance will not
be attributed to the decedent to the extent the proceeds of the policy are
payable to the corporation. " Failure to raise the issue in a timely fashion
prevented it from being contested on appeal in Huntsman. However, it is
expected that the Commissioner will test this issue in future cases where
he feels the decedent benefits from the corporation's use of life insurance
proceeds.
12.00 Subchapter S Corporations
272 1977 INT. REV. BULL. No. 4 at 5.
273 Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(6).
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